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Introduction
The world we live in is increasingly integrated. The last decade
of the 20th century saw a remarkable increase in global interaction
in fields like communication, culture, travel and politics to name just
a few examples. For the work of economists, increasing international
integration bears a significant importance. A vast body of literature
which deals with the topic is proof of that proposition.
International integration of an economy is usually discussed in terms
of its trade and capital flows. Although these are not the only aspects
of the phenomenon, there is no work on the subject without addressing
at least one of these two basic pillars. The present thesis will duly
follow the classic setup.
Early economic theory suggests that open economies fare at least
as good as closed ones. In other words, trade will almost always be
beneficial and hence, from the perspective of this theories there is not
much room for discussion of the phenomenon of the increasing volume
of international trade - the more, the better. The same applies to
capital flows. Fundamental insights have it that international capital
flows are beneficial. International capital flows allow countries to share
risks and to smooth consumption paths. Following these fundamental
insights on capital flows, there is not much room for discussion either
- the more of it, the better.
The real world, however, is not without imperfections. Incorpo-
rating imperfections into economic models has occupied the profession
for the last 50 years and is an ongoing battle. This process brought
about new (and now standard) concepts like asymmetric information,
incomplete markets, moral hazard and sticky prices. In much the same
way that these new advances created new insights in virtually every
corner of reality, the existing economic contributions on international
integration were subject to qualifications. The mantra - the more, the
better - ceased to exist. Today’s International Economics resembles
a collection of small purpose build models. It lacks a unifying frame-
work that encompasses most (or even all) diﬀerent fields. This seems
to be the price for the surrender of economists ignorance with respect
to imperfections.
The present thesis is essentially a work on International Economics.
As such it is no exception in that it consists of diﬀerent chapters, all
of which address a diﬀerent issue of the field. The first two chapters
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are theoretical in nature, whereas the third chapter is empirical. The
last chapter provides a technical reference to mathematical problems
encountered in the first chapter.
The first chapter is concerned with one of the negative aspects of
international trade: terms-of-trade uncertainty. In reality, economies
face uncertainty with respect to the value of their produce in the world
market. The reason for this could be technology shocks, industrial ac-
tion or policy. It is often argued that this uncertainty should not matter
as long the agents have access to well-developed financial markets. In
eﬀect they can buy insurance against this risk. Empirically, however,
this claim seems to have little support. Studies showed that firms only
hedge a small fraction of their exposure to foreign price changes. "In-
ternational Trade, Hedging and the Demand for Forward Contracts"
oﬀers fresh insights as to why agents fail to hedge terms-of-trade uncer-
tainty in the presence of well-developed financial markets. The reason
is an imperfection: incomplete markets. Agents simply cannot fully
hedge away their risk. The incompleteness in our setup can only be
solved with another instrument: options. Hence, the policy implication
of the first chapter is to facilitate the use of options.
The second theoretical model is concerned with the second basic
pillar: international capital flows. The huge increase of international
capital flows is probably the most controversial issue in the discus-
sion on globalization. Several severe financial crises in the eighties and
nineties of the last century have created some doubts over the stabil-
ity of the international financial system in general and the desirability
of capital account liberalization in particular. "International Capital
Flows meet Corporate Liquidity Demand" adds some new insights to
the already huge literature on capital account liberalization. To this
end, we extend a standard model on corporate liquidity demand to a
two-country world. We show that if a country protects the interests of
domestic agents better than those of foreign agents, it will be punished
with more fickle foreign investors. Foreign capital then will be the
proverbial shy deer. Another important result of the second chapter
is that having little capital will severely constrain the economy from
borrowing abroad. This result is an important qualification to the neo-
classical growth literature that predicts the catch-up of poor countries
to the rich via capital flows. Again, an imperfection plays a vital role
for our results and the qualification it adds to standard theory: moral
hazard.
In the debate on globalization increasing trade and capital flows
figure prominently. There are, however, diﬀerent measures and diﬀer-
ent data sources for these flows. The third chapter aims to oﬀer an
overview over the existing sources for both gross and net flow data on
international capital flows. Further, we set out to oﬀer some measures
of the development of goods market integration relative to financial
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market integration. Using data for the last decade, we find that al-
though gross financial flows were increasing relative to trade flows, net
financial flows were not. Hence, we make the claim that goods market
integration actually has had roughly the same speed as international
financial integration in the last decade. Increasing gross flows point
towards lower transaction costs and hence increased eﬃciency in the
global financial markets. In this sense, the integration of the world has
indeed deepened.
The last chapter deals with a particular problem economists en-
counter in models with expected utility maximization. If the first or-
der condition is a nonlinear transformation of the underlying random
variable, explicit demand functions are hard to derive. The chapter
first gives an overview on the existing mathematical tools we have to
tackle the problem and then develops each method in detail using a
simplified version of the model of the first chapter. It turns out that
deriving explicit demand functions is always possible, as long as the
economist is willing to invoke additional restrictions on the parameter
space of the model.
The present thesis would not have been possible to write without the
support of many people. First and foremost, I owe great debt to Pro-
fessor Klaus Wälde, my academic supervisor at Technische Universität
Dresden. In many instances he was the lighthouse in stormy waters
and provided invaluable intellectual impetus. Further thanks are due
to my colleagues Ken Sennewald, BenjaminWeigert and MirkoWieder-
holt and numerous participants at research seminars and conferences
where I had the honour to present parts of my thesis. Financial sup-
port of the State of Saxony, the European Commission and the Banca
D’Italia is gratefully acknowledged. All this outstanding professional
support, however, would have been falling on barren land without the
constant encouragement of my family and friends.

Part 1
Theoretical Inquiries

CHAPTER 1
International Trade, Hedging and the Demand for
Forward Contracts
One of the main results of the literature on the eﬀects of
uncertainty on trade states that uncertainty should not
matter in the presence of well developed forward markets.
Empirical studies, however, do not support this result.
We derive the demand for forward cover in a small open
economy with terms of trade uncertainty. Adopting a
standard and more realistic decision structure than the
one usually used in this literature, we find that risk averse
agents will not buy forwards at an unbiased price. Agents
treat forward contracts as an asset rather than as an
insurance. This is the reason why, when calibrating the
model, only 17% of imports are covered by forwards.
3
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1. Introduction
1,2International trade in goods is characterized by uncertainty. Com-
mon sense and economic theory suggest that exporters, importers and
households should try to hedge against this uncertainty. Natural candi-
dates for hedging instruments are future and forward contracts. In fact,
Ethier (1973) introduced the separation theorem and the full hedge
theorem under exchange rate uncertainty, showing that demand for
forward contracts perfectly compensates uncertainty. Benninga, El-
dor and Zilcha (1985) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) additionally dis-
cussed price level uncertainty, obtaining the same results. Recently,
this strong result has been subject to some qualifications. Viaene and
Zilcha (1998), for example, consider additionally output and cost uncer-
tainty and find that under this setup full-double hedge and separation
fail to hold.
Adam-Müller (2000) introduces inflation risk which cannot be hedged
away and finds that full-hedge and separation break down if the two
sources of risk in the model are not statistically independent. Market
structure issues have been addressed as well, examples are Eldor and
Zilcha (1987) and Broll and Zilcha (1992).
The empirical literature, though spares, does not support the strong
theoretical predictions of the early literature. As Carse, Williamson
and Wood (1980) and others have shown, only roughly one-third of
the value of international trade is covered by forward contracts. Even
equity flows are only poorly hedged. According to Hau and Rey (2003),
only 8% of US equity holdings abroad are hedged against exchange
rate risks. Furthermore, there exists a lively debate in the empirical
literature as to whether exchange rate volatility depresses trade levels
or not. This debate is related to the issue of demand for forwards in
that often the argument is made that as long as agents have access
to well developed forward markets, the uncertainty should not matter.
Strikingly, the evidence is rather mixed and seems to be independent
of the existence of well developed forward markets (see Coté (1994) for
a survey on the empirical evidence and Wei (1998) for a discussion of
the underlying causes).
This chapter reconciles empirical findings with theoretical consid-
erations. We show that by allowing agents to optimally choose their
consumption bundle after resolution of price uncertainty - which is in
contrast to the literature on forwards but standard in e.g. macro mod-
els with uncertainty - forward contracts resemble normal assets rather
1Together with Klaus Wälde.
2Thanks are due to Jacques Olivier, Philipp Hartmann, Lucie White, Christian
Gollier and seminar participants at the Universities of Bonn, Konstanz and Toulouse
for discussion and helpful comments.
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than insurance contracts. As forward contracts tend to have lower re-
turns than e.g. physical capital, agents do not hold many of those
assets and trade flows are only purely hedged.
We build an infinite horizon small open economy model where one
good is domestically produced with capital and labour, another good is
imported. Both goods are consumed. Capital is accumulated and risk
averse households hedge optimally against terms of trade uncertainty.3
One forward contract allows (and obliges) them to buy one import good
in the next period at a fixed price pY .
We first study the determinants of demand for forwards. We show
that the exogenous internationally given forward price pY is the crucial
determinant of demand for forwards. When this forward price equals
the expected price of the import good, i.e. when the forward price
is unbiased, risk averse households do not want to buy any forwards
- they would actually want to sell forwards. When the forward price
equals the price at which risk neutral households would be indiﬀerent,
risk averse households demand a positive amount of forward contracts.
Risk averse households want to sell forwards at unbiased prices
as their utility function is concave in consumption levels. With con-
sumption levels optimally chosen ex-post, indirect utility functions of
individuals exhibit convexity in prices, though still concavity in ex-
penditure. As expenditure is a function of prices as well, overall, the
indirect utility function exhibits convexity in prices and households are
actually (price-) risk lovers. Positive demand therefore requires a price
that is suﬃciently low, e.g. the price oﬀered by risk neutral households.
Intuitively, we could think of the risk averse households as not willing
to commit themselves to a consumption decision when faced with price
uncertainty. They do not want to give away the option to adjust their
consumption bundles.
We then calibrate the model by using realistic and reasonable para-
meter values. We find that between 10% and 20% of international trade
is covered by forward contracts. The low ratios cited in the empirical
literature are therefore not surprising and may reflect the curvature
of utility functions of utility maximizing households. Partial equilib-
rium setups or setups focusing on risk neutral firms should therefore
be extended to take this aspect into consideration.
We are not the first that find that full-hedge theorem and sepa-
ration theorem do not hold. As argued above, there is a substantial
literature that finds that these two theorems will not hold as soon as
certain conditions are violated. Our result, however, is derived in a
3In contrast to the majority of the literature on that topic, households demand
forwards, not firms. This, however, simply follows from the general equlibrium
setup we use. Firms are owned by the households, who look ”through” them. A
similar argument is made in Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998, pp. 18).
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completely diﬀerent manner. The crucial point is the decision struc-
ture of our agents. The standard approach assumes that all decisions
are made before the resolution of uncertainty. In contrast, we employ
an alternative decision rule, which is commonly used in macro models
with uncertainty. In the first period, still before resolution of uncer-
tainty, the agents decide upon their level of hedging and in the second,
after the uncertainty is resolved, the agents actually make their con-
sumption decision. Following this approach, agents will never be able
to eliminate uncertainty from their budgets and hence are faced with a
trade-oﬀ. As a consequence, risk averse agents will never buy forward
cover under unbiased insurance prices.
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section introduces
the model, section 3 presents the solution of the model and the sub-
sequent section discusses equilibrium properties and presents results.
Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2. The model
2.1. Technologies. We study a small open economy that pro-
duces one good X that is internationally traded. It imports a foreign
consumption good Y which is not domestically produced. Domestic
production requires capital K and labour L, which are non-tradable,
Xt = X (Kt, Lt) . (1.1)
Time is discrete and variables are indexed by t. The production func-
tion X (.) has the standard neoclassical properties. Firms produce
under perfect competition and factor rewards wLt and w
K
t for labour
and capital are given by their value marginal productivities,
wLt = p
X
t ∂Xt/∂Lt, w
K
t = p
X
t ∂Xt/∂Kt. (1.2)
The number of units of the import good to be exchanged for one unit of
the export good, i.e. international terms of trade pXt /p
Y
t at a point in
time t, are exogenously given to the economy and random. Before any
trade in t takes place, prices for period t become common knowledge.
Prices for period t + 1 are not known in t but the density function
f
¡
pXτ /p
Y
τ
¢
of pXτ /p
Y
τ for τ > t is common knowledge. In what follows,
we choose X as numeraire and denote its price by pX ,
pXt+1 = p
X
t ≡ pX .
One can therefore think of the price of the domestic good as a deter-
ministic price and of the price of the foreign good as stochastic.
Domestic output X from the production process (1.1) is used for
domestic consumption CXt , exports X
E
t and gross investment It,
Xt = CXt +X
E
t + It. (1.3)
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Letting δ capture depreciation, capital grows according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (1.4)
In addition to producing the good Y, foreign agents oﬀer forward
contracts. At transaction costs of χ ≥ 0 per unit to be paid in t,
domestic agents can buy forward contracts from foreign agents. Thus,
foreign agents agree in t to sell in t+1 one unit of the foreign good at the
exogenous internationally given price pY . This is equivalent to fixing
in t next periods terms of trade at pX/pY . When forward contracts
of total volume Dt are signed, foreign agents agree to sell Dt units of
good Y at pY in t+1. Domestic buyers commit to buy in t+1 at this
price, irrespective of the realization of pYt+1.
4
2.2. Households. The horizon of the economy is infinite. Agents
in this economy live for two periods. They work in the first period
of their life and consume in the second period. Consumption in the
second period comprises both the domestically produced good and the
foreign good.
2.2.1. Preferences and budget constraints. The utility function of
households is given by
v = v (u (CX , CY )) ,
where u (CX , CY ) is some homothetic utility function and v (.) deter-
mines the degree of risk aversion. For illustrating purposes, we will
later use
u (CX , CY ) = CαXC
1−α
Y , 0 < α < 1 (1.5)
v (x) =
x
σ
σ
, 1 ≥ σ > 0. (1.6)
Note that the utility function (1.5) displays risk aversion towards the
consumption levels. Risk aversion in total consumption expenditure is
given for 0 < σ < 1, risk neutrality in consumption expenditure would
be represented by σ = 1.
A household’s first period budget constraint equates labor income
with savings and transaction costs for financial contracts Dt,5
wt = st + χDt. (1.7)
Savings are used to buy capital goods st/pX . There is the implicit
assumption of a market in which today’s old, being the owners of the
capital stock sell it to today’s young in exchange for consumption good
4If, in contrast, Dt represented options, domestic agents would not be obliged
to buy and thus only draw on the contract in favorable situations. This will be
analysed in section 4.5.
5We are grateful to one Referee who pointed out that our setup is similar to an
endowment economy: The endowment is given by the wage wt and agents decide
whether to transfer this endowment into the next period by holding capital or
buying forward contracts.
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X, which in turn constitutes the wage of today’s young. The sum
over all individual savings equal the current capital stock (i.e. after
depreciation) plus additional aggregate investment,
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It =
st
pX
L. (1.8)
In the second period, households use all of their wealth and other
income for financing consumption expenditure et+1. End of second
period wealth amounts to pX (1− δ) stpX = (1− δ)Kt+1. Factor rewards
for wealth amount to pX ∂Xt+1∂Kt+1
st
pX . Income from forward contracts is¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
Dt, which might be negative. Hence
et+1 ≡ pXCX + pYt+1CY = (1 + rt+1) pX
wt − χDt
pX
+
¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
Dt,
(1.9)
where we defined
1 + rt+1 ≡ 1 +
∂Xt+1
∂Kt+1
− δ (1.10)
and savings st were replaced by using the first period budget constraint
(1.7).
The second period budget constraint (1.9) nicely shows that payoﬀs¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
Dt from forward contracts are positive and therefore a sec-
ond period source of income when the price pYt+1 of good Y is suﬃciently
high relative to its exogenous price pY specified one period before. For-
ward contracts imply a loss in the case of low price of good Y. Of
course, bad terms of trade shocks leading to income and good terms
of trade shocks leading to losses from forward contracts are the reason
why forwards exist: they insure against terms of trade shocks.
This budget constraint also shows that households can not insure
fully against terms of trade risk. Forward contracts refer to a certain
amount of goods that can be purchased at this fixed price pY . As the
actual amount of goods consumed depends on the realization pYt+1 of the
price, some uncertainty always remains. This is the crucial departure
of our model from the classic setups in the hedging literature Ethier
(1973, pp. 496) and Benninga et al. (1985, pp. 540). There, firms
decide today in t how much they will produce tomorrow in t+ 1. This
allows them to fully insure against uncertainty in the price of their
output good. The well-known separation theorem of no uncertainty
after hedging results. If our agents knew how much they will consume
tomorrow, full hedging would be possible as well. They will never know,
however, as price uncertainty has an income eﬀect as well.
2.2.2. A no-bankruptcy constraint. In order to avoid insolvency of
households, we have to introduce a no-bankruptcy constraint. Our
point of departure is the expenditure equation (1.9). As negative ex-
penditure is not feasible, we argue that the worst that can happen to
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the budget of our agents is an expenditure of zero,
et = (1 + rt+1)wt +
¡
pYt+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
¢
Dt = 0.
Solving for Dt yields
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt
(1 + rt+1)χ+ pY − pYt+1
.
Regarding our forward, the most unfavorable situation for households
is pYt+1 = 0. Prudence thus demands that the amount of Dt an agent is
allowed to purchase shall never be any greater than
Dt ≤
(1 + rt+1)wt
(1 + rt+1)χ+ pY
. (1.11)
This condition makes intuitively sense: the greater the contracted
price pY and the greater the costs of forward cover χ, the smaller the
amount of forwards the agents are allowed to buy. Similarly, the greater
the interest rate and wage income wt, the greater the amount of Dt the
agents can commit to. Note that the interest rate rt+1 is deterministic
and hence known in period t, since the capital stock is determinis-
tic and there are no technology shocks in the model. The expression
(1 + rt+1)wt then simply gives maximum period t + 1 income, com-
puted in period t. The denominator of (1.11) in turn gives the highest
possible costs of the forward position, evaluated in period t. This ra-
tio gives the number of forwards Dt an agent can buy such that in
the most unfavorable realization of forward prices the agent still has a
non-negative expenditure level.
3. Solving the model
3.1. The maximization problem of households. The maxi-
mization problem of households consists in choosing the amount Dt
of forward contracts and optimal consumption levels CX and CY such
that expected utility E[v (u (CX , CY ))] is maximized, given the budget
constraint (1.9).
Conceptually, maximization can be subdivided into two steps. The
second step consists in allocating consumption expenditure to goods
X and Y, taking consumption expenditure as given. This second sub-
problem is solved after realization of terms of trade. It is therefore a
choice under certainty. The Cobb-Douglas specification (1.5) implies
CXt+1 =
αet+1
pX
, (1.12)
CYt+1 =
(1− α) et+1
pYt+1
. (1.13)
These equations hold at each point in time and determine consumption
levels after uncertainty has been resolved.
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The first step consists in choosing the optimal amountDt of forward
contracts that maximizesE[v
¡
et+1/P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢¢
]where v
¡
et+1/P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢¢
is indirect utility where consumption levels in the homothetic utility
function u (CX , CY ) have been replaced by optimal consumption lev-
els. Utility u (CX , CY ) can then be written as expenditure divided
by the price index. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the price index reads
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢
= ΦpαXp
1−α
Y , where Φ is a constant. Expenditure is given
by (1.9).
This two-step solution to our maximization problem is made pos-
sible by assuming that consumption takes place only when agents are
old. If consumption were to take place in both periods, the consump-
tion choice in the first period would be linked to the saving decision.
The system that would have to be analyzed would be more complicated
(as an intertemporal consumption rule would have to be added).
The solution to this problem is then given by the first order condi-
tion
E
"
v0
Ã
et+1
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢! pYt+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢ # = 0, (1.14)
where the expectations operator refers to the entire bracket [.]. This
condition consists of two parts. The first is marginal utility v0 (.), here
expressed in the form of the indirect utility function. Marginal utility
is positive but decreasing in consumption levels, or as stated here,
increasing in expenditure and decreasing in prices. The denominator of
the second term, pYt+1−(1 + rt+1)χ−pY , represents the realized nominal
return from the forwards. Its expected value is negative under unbiased
(or actuarially fair6) forwards, i.e. if E[pYt+1] = p
Y , since the term
(1 + rt+1)χ representing the opportunity costs of entering the forward
market enters negatively. If forwards could be obtained without costs,
clearly these opportunity costs would vanish and unbiased forwards
would have an expected nominal return of zero. Dividing the nominal
return by the price index gives the complete second term, the real
return of the forward contract.
Now that the meaning of the two components of (1.14) is clear,
the intuition of this first order condition is more easy to see. The
expectations operator is an integral in our case where terms-of-trade
is a continuous random variable. This integral can be split into a
6In the literature, actuarially fair refers to a situation where the expected pay-
oﬀ of an insurance is equal to the insurance premium (Kreps, 1990, p. 92 or Dixit,
1990, p. 124). Unbiasedness usually describes a (statistical) property of the forward
price, i.e. E[pY ] = pY (Zilcha and Broll, 1992, p. 475 or Viaene and Zilcha, 1998,
p. 594). As we do not explicitly model how the forward price pY is determined, we
use the expression unbiasedness. Note, however, that the two concepts would be
identical if we assumed that the forward price is the outcome of competition among
perfectly competitive firms and χ are opportunity cost of buyers of insurance (e.g.
shipping cost) and not risk-premia for the insurer.
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negative and a positive part. As long as pYt+1 < (1 + rt+1)χ + p
Y , the
realized price is in the "loss region". Marginal utility is multiplied by a
negative number and this interval of the integral contributes negatively.
Concavity of the utility function with respect to the amount of forwards
implies that as long as (1.14) is negative, the agents have too many
forwards and hence should decrease holdings. On the other hand, as
soon as pYt+1 > (1 + rt+1)χ − pY - the "win region" - marginal utility
contributes positively. Again, concavity tells us that as long as (1.14) is
positive agents should increase holdings of Dt. However, given positive
costs to obtain forward cover, i.e. χ > 0, increasing Dt will increase rt,
hence opportunity costs will rise as well, up to a point where marginal
utility will fall in Dt. Hence the optimal amount of Dt is such that the
positive and the negative components of the integral just balance.
3.2. Reduced form. The reduced form of the model consists of
two equations. The capital stock in the next period is given by savings
today times the number L of individuals and divided by the price of
one unit of capital and is given by (1.8) . With the first-period budget
constraint (1.7) giving individual savings, we obtain
Kt+1 =
pXt ∂Xt/∂L− χDt
pX
L, (1.15)
where the wage rate was replaced by its value marginal product (1.2) .
The amount of forward contracts is determined by the first order
condition (1.14). Consumption of the old is given by the current cap-
ital stock, interest payments on the current capital stock plus income
(or losses) from forward contracts. Using the budget constraint (1.9) ,
where wages wt were replaced by value marginal productivities in (1.2) ,
expenditure in (1.14) therefore equals
et+1 = (1 + rt+1) pX∂X (Kt, L) /∂L+
¡
pYt+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
¢
Dt.
(1.16)
Equilibrium in our economy is therefore described by equations (1.14)
and (1.15), given (1.16) . These equations determine the two variables
Kt and Dt, given an initial capital stock K0.
Equation (1.15) , determining the evolution of capital, shows that
next periods capital is known in t. By contrast, expenditure (1.16) is
uncertain when some forward contracts are signed. This makes con-
sumption levels of both goods and exports and imports uncertain. If
no forward contracts are signed (D = 0), expenditure is deterministic,
consumption of good X would be deterministic but consumption of
good Y would be stochastic.
3.3. Steady-state. In the steady state, the capital stock is the
same in each period. Variables that are constant are printed without
a time subscript. All stochastic variables are denoted by a tilde (~).
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The capital stock is then determined by
K =
pX∂X/∂L− χD
pX
L (1.17)
and is therefore a deterministic variable. Domestic production (1.1) is
then deterministic as well, X = F (K,L) . Steady state expenditure e˜
is given from (1.16) as
e˜ = (1 + r) pX∂X/∂L+
¡
p˜Y − (1 + r)χ− pY
¢
D (1.18)
and remains stochastic. Using (1.18) , D follows implicitly from the
first order condition (1.14),
E
·
v0
µ
e˜
P (pX , p˜Y )
¶
p˜Y − (1 + r)χ− pY
P (pX , p˜Y )
¸
= 0. (1.19)
4. Equilibrium properties
Given the steady state quantities of the capital stockK and forward
contracts D as determined in (1.17) and (1.19) with (1.18), will agents
want to hold a positive amount of forwards? This will be analyzed
in the next subsection. In order to obtain an idea about quantita-
tive predictions, we calibrate the model in the subsequent section and
provide numerical results afterwards. We also perform a comparative
static analysis and finally introduce options as an alternative to for-
wards. By deriving several equilibrium properties under options, the
properties of forwards will also become clearer.
4.1. The equilibrium demand for forwards. We now present
three important results with respect to the existence of interior solu-
tions, i.e. a positive demand for forwards D in the steady state. For
simplicity, we set transaction cost equal to zero, χ = 0, in what follows.
Note that this implies by (1.17) a capital stock that is independent of
the choice of D. All proofs are in app. 6.1.
Theorem 1.1. Risk averse agents will not buy forward cover at
unbiased prices, i.e. E[p˜Y ] = pY .
We illustrate this result in figure 1. It plots expected utility of
agents in the steady state, E[v
¡
e˜/P
¡
pX , p˜Y
¢¢
], as a function of for-
wards D, taking expenditure from (1.18) into account.7
Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of forwards D
The figure shows how expected utility of households depends only
on forwards, provided that they anticipate the choice of consumption
levels, and thereby illustrates the maximization problem of section 3.1.
7All numerical results were obtained by using Mathematica. The files are avail-
able upon request.
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Figure 1
Since our objective function is globally concave in D (see app. 6.4),
the sign of the first derivative of this function with respect to D at the
point D = 0 determines whether or not there is an interior solution.
As plotted above, expected utility would be maximized at a negative
D. Agents therefore do not want to hold forward contracts.
In the light of the existing literature on the topic this result is
rather surprising. The standard result states8 that if an unbiased for-
ward market exists, agents use this market to avoid all uncertainty, i.e.
they obtain full cover for their position. The crucial diﬀerence of our
model to the literature lies in the timing structure. The main body9
of the literature assumes that all decisions are made before uncertainty
is resolved. In contrast, we assume, as is standard in e.g. stochastic
macro models, that although the agents decide on the optimal amount
of forward cover before uncertainty is resolved, their consumption de-
cision is made after the resolution of the price uncertainty. Under this
setup, buying forward contracts amounts to no less than restricting
one’s possibilities to adjust to price realizations. Risk averse agents
will not give away this opportunity. It is clear that there are some
decisions that will be made in advance and for this part the analysis
of the existing literature would be appropriate. We believe, however,
that most of consumption decisions are made when actual consumption
takes place and prices are known.
Theorem 1.2. Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for
suﬃciently low pY , i.e. E[p˜Y ] > pY .
8See, inter alia, Ethier (1973), Benninga et al. (1985), Kawai and Zilcha (1986),
Eldor and Zilcha (1987), Viaene and de Vries (1992), Zilcha and Broll (1992), Viaene
and Zilcha (1998) and Adam-Müller (2000).
9There are a few papers that discuss the theoretical possibility of a diﬀerent
timing structure, an example being Perée and Steinherr (1989). We are, however,
not aware of any work that explicitely models this.
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Note that this result follows from the first theorem. One possible
interpretation would be that if pY is lower than the expected value of
the price pYt+1, the average return of a forward position will be positive.
Thus the agent will be compensated for giving up their possibility to
adjust their consumption bundle according to the price realizations in
the next period. Hence the agents are willing to hold a forward position.
Theorem 1.3. If the exogenous forward price amounts to pY =
E[pαY ]
E[pα−1Y ]
, i.e. the price risk neutral households would oﬀer, risk averse
agents will buy forward contracts.10
To illustrate the third result, imagine a figure similar to figure 1 for
risk-neutral households. Letting the forward price be given by the risk-
neutral price pY = E [pαY ] /E
£
pα−1Y
¤
, the slope of the expected utility
at D = 0 is zero. The slope of expected indirect utility at this point
D = 0 can be expressed, for any given value of pY , as a function of the
degree of risk aversion. Theorem 3 essentially states that the more risk
averse agents are, the larger the slope becomes. Hence, moving from
risk neutrality, i.e. σ = 1, to risk aversion is equivalent to shifting the
whole graph to the right. This in turn implies that the forward price
pY at which the risk neutral agents are just indiﬀerent between buying
and selling induces a positive demand by any risk averse agent.
Note that these results may be somewhat surprising, given the ”full-
hedge theorem” we normally encounter in the literature (see Ethier
(1973) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) for example). The reason for
this is that our model diﬀers from the usual models such that agents
always face uncertainty through the price-index channel, whereas in
the former models there is the possibility to avoid all uncertainty, for
agents completely decide upon their plans in period one. Risk averse
agents do not want to lose the ability to adjust to price shocks in the
next period, whereas risk neutral agents are indiﬀerent towards this
opportunity.
Secondly, we have another factor at work here. By buying forward
contracts the agents trade one risk against the other. Holding a forward
position means that risk now directly aﬀects nominal income. This can
be easily seen from (1.9). Risk aversion regarding nominal income and
the uncertainty through the price-index channel are the reasons for the
agents asking for more than unbiased forwards.
Figure 2: The indirect utility function which is convex in pY
The convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to the
prices is illustrated in figure 2. It shows indirect utility as a function
of the foreign price. Convexity of indirect utility with respect to prices
10Strictly speaking, we should write
¡
pY
¢α
. To simplify notation, we use pαY and
deviate from our convention of indicating the type of the good with superscripts.
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implies that agents prefer any linear combination of prices to the aver-
age of this linear combination. Hence, agents are in fact risk-lovers with
respect to period two price uncertainty. Note that this result entirely
hinges on the timing assumption of the consumption decision.
4.2. Calibrating the model. We will now calibrate our model
as this allows us to provide quantitative results in the next subsection
and perform a comparative static analysis subsequently. We begin with
discussing the chosen values. Solving the model numerically involves
computing values of both D and K which satisfy (1.17) and simulta-
neously (1.19). To get numerical results, we need to specify a couple
of parameters and the underlying distribution. As far as possible, this
is achieved by drawing on real world data.
Parameter L α β δ χ σ Φ S pX
Value 100 4
5
3
10
0.54 1
100
1
2
1
αα(1−α)1−α 1 1
Table 1: Parameter values used for calibrating
As a first step, we specify the production technology by a Cobb-
Douglas form, X (K,L) = SKβL1−β. The scale parameter for the
technology, S, is set to one. Equation (1.17) depends on various pa-
rameters: PX is the price of the numeraire good and can thus be set
to one. Transaction costs for forwards are captured by χ in our setup.
One could think of χ as including some kind of market price of the
forward contract or of obtaining forward cover. These two concepts
are in fact quite diﬀerent. In reality, the market price of the forward
cover is quite small, whereas the real costs of obtaining forward cover
may very well be substantial.11 This leaves some room for determining
11Think of a firm which has to hire expertise to contract such cover and
thus may have substantial costs. In terms of transfers, the χDs, think of mar-
gin requirements.
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the value of χ and thus we will set this value arbitrarily, but close to
zero. In our calibration we use 1/100. The size of the population, as
the TFP measure S, is just a scale parameter and therefore no further
elaboration is necessary. We set L = 100. The output elasticity β in
our production function reflects relative shares of capital and labour
and is commonly found (e.g. Maddison, 1987, p. 658) to be around
0.3.
The second reduced form equation (1.19) and (1.18) require the
specification of some parameters as well. Depreciation is assumed to
be 2.5% per year. With one period representing 30 years in our two-
period OLG setup, we have δ = 0.54.12 The price pY is determined by
the price at which risk neutral individuals would oﬀer the forwards,
i.e.13
pY =
E[p˜αY ]− (1 + r)χE[p˜α−1Y ]
E[p˜α−1Y ]
. (1.20)
Equation (1.20) is determined by using the first order condition (1.19),
setting σ = 1 and solving for pY (see app. 6.1). The parameter of
the utility function, α, determines the share of domestic in total con-
sumption. Using data from ’Statistisches Bundesamt’, the empirically
observed share of foreign products in total consumption in Germany
is approximately 0.8. To determine the most appropriate distribution,
we obtained monthly price index data for both import prices and ex-
port prices over the period January 1962 until January 2002, leaving
us with 482 observations. Dividing the import index by the export
index amounts, in terms of our model, to obtaining the price series
pYt . The shape of the histogram suggested choosing a lognormal dis-
tribution, which is an assumption commonly made, for example in the
finance literature.14 The parameters of the distribution were obtained
by maximum likelihood estimation.15 The estimates were
Distribution E[p˜Y ] E[p˜Y ]2
lognormal 0.1149 0.0071
underlying normal 1.1261 0.0103
Table 2: Parameters of the lognormal and the underlying normal dis-
tribution
12This follows from (1− 0.025)30 ≈ 0, 46. Hence 46% of the capital stock
remains and 54% are lost after 30 years of constant annual depreciation of 2,5%.
13As stated in the model section, p¯Y is exogenously given by international
markets. We use this equation to find a plausible value for p¯Y . It does not mean
that p¯Y is endogenous in our model.
14The Black-Scholes formula relies on lognormality of prices. Even in interna-
tional macro this assumption is often used, see for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1998).
15We use R and the function fitdistr which is included in the MASS package.
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4.3. A numerical solution. We now present a simulation result
for a small country. Under lognormal distributed price uncertainty,
using the parameter specification we presented above, we found that
the economy will buy a total amount of 1.62 units of forward contracts,
given the price risk neutral agents would oﬀer. The capital stock and
thus GDP of the economy can be calculated and using the mean on the
distribution as the realization of the price in period two, the economy
will import 9.5 units of good Y . This means that the forward cover to
import ratio is in this case approximately 17%. This is in accordance
to surveys on the topic. For example Carse et al. (1980) found that
firms that import or export and thus face terms of trade risk, only
cover between 15-30% of their open positions.
Some caveats are in order here. First, the actual terms of trade
variance may well be underestimated with our proxy used. If this is
true, the calculated amount of forwards is too high as well. Second,
the costs of forwards we used are to some degree arbitrary. They are,
however, close to the actual transaction fees charged by banks but
would not incorporate such items as information costs and fixed costs
for setting up the appropriate institutions, letting alone deliberation
costs. To the extent to which the actual costs are higher, our result
overestimates the amount of forwards purchased. Third, there is the
issue of the degree of risk aversion with respect to wealth. In the
literature there is no consensus on that parameter. We choose to set
this parameter, 1−σ in our model, to 1/2, which is a conservative choice
in the sense that a broad range of publications support this choice. It
also turns out that this particular parameter is the least influential
in altering our results. Lastly, our result is to some extent related to
the literature on international portfolio diversification, i.e. the home
bias puzzle in equity holdings. One strand of this literature (see for
example Baxter and Jerman (1997)) argues that in order to explain
actual portfolio holdings quantitatively, one needs to consider multiple
sources of uncertainty. Recently, however, other contributions - see as
an example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) who consider trade costs as the
relevant explanation for the observed home bias in equity holdings -
have relied on a more parsimonious specification with only one source
of uncertainty. We follow here the more parsimonious approach. The
aforementioned qualifications notwithstanding, this numerical exercise
recapitulates our analytical results and shows that the model is able to
fit the actual data for reasonable parameter values.
4.4. Comparative statics. There are a couple of interesting ques-
tions arising when changing the parameters. We begin with the terms
of trade variance. If there is an exogenously induced increase in the
variance of the foreign price, we observe a fall in the demand for for-
wards. At our calculated equilibrium point, we observe a decrease of
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4.7% in demand for forwards if we increase the variance by 1%. This
is accordance with the intuition for our results. Risk averse agents are
not willing to give up the possibility to adjust themselves to a terms of
trade shock. The greater the likelihood of a terms of trade shock, the
more they have to be compensated for holding forward contracts.
Next consider the costs of the forwards. If costs decrease, demand
will increase. At the point of our interior solution a 1% decrease in the
costs would induce a 16% rise in the demand for forward contracts.
Lastly we look at the degree of risk aversion. A society which is
more risk averse than another will demand less forward cover than the
less risk averse society. A 1% increase of the degree of risk aversion,
i.e. a 1% fall in σ, reduces demand for forwards by 0.4%.
6
-
K
D K = p
X∂X/∂L−χD
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E
h
v0
³
e˜
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´
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P (pX ,p˜Y )
i
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Figure 3: Comparative static results
The comparative static results are summarized in Figure 3. An
increase in the variance of pY , an increase in the costs χ and an increase
in the degree of risk aversion will ceteris paribus decrease the demand
for forward cover by shifting the schedule implied by (1.14) downwards.
Note that in the case of changing costs χ, the capital schedule will also
shift.
4.5. Options. In order to give additional insights into the work-
ings of our model, we will in this section examine what the optimal
hedging behavior would be if the agents could buy options instead of
forward contracts to insure against the uncertainty regarding the price
of the foreign good. A (call) option, as opposed to a forward contract,
does not oblige to buy the underlying asset (or commodity), instead
the buyer can choose whether or not he will exercise his option. Keep-
ing our notation, we can extend our model very easily to model an
option instead of a forward contract by observing that in the event
pYt ≤ pY , the buyer of that option would simply not exercise it. To
model options, we only have to change the expenditure equation into
et+1 =
½
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt) +
¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
Dt+1
¾
∀ pYt+1
½
≤
>
¾
pY .
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Dt now denotes the amount of options instead of forward contracts, the
strike price being pY . By buying one option for the price χ, an agent
is entitled to buy one unit of good Y in the next period for the price
pY . The first order condition (1.14) now becomesZ pY
0
v0
Ã
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢ ! −χ (1 + rt+1)
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢ dP Y + (1.21)
Z ∞
pY
v0
Ã
et+1
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢! pYt − pY − χ (1 + rt+1)
P
¡
pX , pYt+1
¢ dP Y = 0,
where P Y is the cumulative density function of pYt+1. Three results
emerge for the steady state (see app. 6.3).
Theorem 1.4. If options are costless, i.e. χ = 0, the optimal
amount is infinity, D =∞.
This is probably the most straightforward result. Rational agents,
being oﬀered a free lunch, will happily accept this. Here the free lunch
comes as a free lottery ticket, without any risk of loosing. We present
this otherwise not very surprising result to make the structure of the
decision problem clearer.
Theorem 1.5. If agents can choose between options and forwards
at the same costs, they will always choose options.
To facilitate the comparison between forwards and options, we
present the second result. It constitutes, again, a standard property of
the utility function of the agents. Forwards will always be dominated
by options, as long as the price is the same for both.
These two theorems imply that we can replicate the real-world co-
existence of options and forwards in our model. This necessitates that
either forwards cost less or are more than unbiased (or both).
Theorem 1.6. Let transaction costs for options be given by χ. If
options are unbiased, i.e. E[p˜Y ] = pY , agents will demand a positive
amount of options.
Our last results highlights again the diﬀerence between forwards and
options. In contrast to forward contracts there exist a positive demand,
depending on the price χ, of "unbiased options", that is options that
have a strike price that equals the expected value of the price in the
next period.
5. Conclusion
One largely debated issue in international economics is the question
whether or not volatility in exchange rates and terms of trade depresses
trade levels. There is an extensive literature on that question, both
theoretical and empirical. The main body of the theoretical literature
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claims that terms of trade and/or exchange rate uncertainty does not
matter as long as well developed forward and futures markets exist.
This literature further predicts that agents fully hedge the existing
risks. The empirical work done in this field fails to unambiguously
support these findings.
We model a small open economy that is subject to terms of trade
risk originating entirely from abroad. Agents can buy forward contracts
to insure against this uncertainty but can adjust consumption bundles
after terms of trade have realized. This small departure from the stan-
dard assumption in the hedging literature where consumption can not
be adjusted after resolution of uncertainty implies that forward con-
tracts turn into an asset. When forward contracts are unbiased, there
is no demand for terms of trade insurance, a direct eﬀect of the convex-
ity of the indirect utility function with respect to prices. Risk aversion
with respect to consumption levels and expenditure levels is not a suf-
ficient motive to buy forwards. We derive conditions under which, on
part of the risk averters, a positive demand for forwards exists. Again,
this demand does not stem from hedging but purely from investment
motives.
We calibrate our model with data for Germany to obtain numerical
solutions. The equilibrium amount of forwards contracted in relation to
the equilibrium amount of imports closely resembles the empirical ob-
served values, thus providing a rationale for the apparent underhedging
of domestic agents against price level and/or exchange rate uncertainty.
The reason for low hedging lies again in the asset-nature of forwards:
As returns for forwards should be lower than returns for e.g. capital,
few futures will be held and hedging is low. We also showed that op-
tions, in contrast to forwards, will be bought as means of insurance.
At unbiased prices, options strictly dominate forward contracts. This
may help explain why the market for options has grown exponentially
over the last decade or so.
The main contribution of our analysis, however, is that the ”price-
convexity” eﬀect should be incorporated in the existing models, which
could be achieved by giving up the assumption that all plans are irrev-
ocably made in the period which precedes the resolution of the uncer-
tainty. This should alter dramatically the strong theoretical predictions
of this literature with respect to forward markets and should thus pro-
vide a better understanding of the eﬀects at work here. Since forwards
are unattractive and options perhaps too expensive, our analysis may
also provide an additional argument in favor of international capital
flows, and hence capital account liberalization, as a means of insuring
the economy.
Our work can be extended in some promising ways. First, to un-
derstand the implications of covariance eﬀects so often at work in the
hedging process money and thus a nominal exchange rate could be
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brought into the model. This would also allow a comparison between
our modeling approach and the existing literature that has proceeded
with considering multiple sources of risk. Another interesting extension
would be to explicitly study the eﬀect of heterogeneity in risk-aversion.
This would allow to endogenize the forward price pY and thereby to
confirm (as we would expect) that returns on forwards as assets are
low. This would strengthen our explanation that trade coverage is low
because forwards are assets.
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6. Mathematical appendix
6.1. Proofs of forward theorems.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the first-order condition (1.19)
and set transaction costs to zero, χ = 0. Analyzing the point D = 0,
the derivative of expected utility is negative iﬀ
E
"µ
(1 + r)w
p˜1−αY
¶σ−1 p˜Y − pY
p˜1−αY
#
< 0⇔ (1.22)
E
h
((1 + r)w)σ−1
³
p˜−σ(1−α)Y (p˜
Y − pY )
´i
< 0⇔ (1.23)
((1 + r)w)σ−1
©
E
£
p˜−cY
¤
E
£
p˜Y
¤
+ Cov
£
p˜−cY , p˜
Y
¤
− pYE
£
p˜−cY
¤ª
< 0,
where the last equality used the definition E
£
p˜−cY
¤
≡ E
h
p˜−σ(1−α)Y
i
, i.e.
c = σ (1− α) > 0. (1.24)
Two results emerge. First, since Cov[p˜−cY , p˜Y ] is negative
16, we have for
E [p˜Y ] = pY :
((1 + r)w)σ−1 ∗ Cov[p˜−cY , pY ] < 0
Together with the result from app. 6.4 that d2EU/dD2 < 0, we know
that there cannot be an interior solution with D > 0. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. For any interior solution, we need the
first order condition to be fulfilled. This requires, at the point D = 0,
E
£
p˜−cY
¤
E [p˜Y ] + Cov[p˜−cY , p˜Y ]− pYE
£
p˜−cY
¤
= 0.
This implies E [p˜Y ] +
Cov[p˜−c
Y
p˜Y ]
E[p˜−cY ]
= pY < E [p˜Y ] , which is our second
result. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. The third result is approached in a slightly
diﬀerent manner. Define a function ξ (c) which gives the sign of the
first order condition (1.19) at the point D = 0. This function is from
(1.23) given by
ξ (c) = E
h³
p˜−σ(1−α)Y (p˜
Y − pY )
´i
= E
h
p˜1−σ(1−α)Y − p˜
−σ(1−α)
Y p
Y
i
= E
£
p˜1−cY
¤
− pYE
£
p˜−cY
¤
,
16This follows from the fact that in our case we have f 0 (pY ) ∗ g0 (pY ) ≤ 0
∀p where f (pY ) = pY and g (pY ) = p−cY . An application of Chebychevs second
inequality brings the result that Cov
¡
pY , p−cY
¢
≤ 0. See Hardy, Littlewood and
Polya (1952, pp. 43 and p.168).
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where the last step used the definition of c in (1.24). Surely, a price pY
for which an interior solution exists is given by
pY =
E
£
p˜1−cY
¤
E
£
p˜−cY
¤ .
When we consider risk neutral households, the optimization problem
will remain unchanged. Hence, the price at which risk-neutral agents,
for which σ = 1, are indiﬀerent between buying and selling forwards is,
pY =
E [p˜αY ]
E[p˜α−1Y ]
. (1.25)
At this price and for risk-neutral agents, the slope of the expected
utility function at D = 0 is zero.
Now diﬀerentiate ξ (c) with respect to c,
dξ
dc
= −E
£
p˜1−cY ln pY
¤
+ pYE
£
p˜−cY ln p˜Y
¤
= −E
£
p˜1−cY
¤
E [ln p˜Y ]− Cov[p˜1−cY , ln p˜Y ]
+
E
£
p˜1−cY
¤
E
£
p˜−cY
¤ E £p˜−cY ¤E [ln p˜Y ] + Cov[p−cY , ln p˜Y ]
= −Cov[p˜1−cY , ln p˜Y ] + Cov[p˜−cY , ln p˜Y ].
Observe that c in (1.24) is bounded, 0 < c < 1. Hence, the derivative
is negative, for both covariance terms are negative. This implies that
the more agents are risk avers, i.e. the lower c, the more the slope of
the first order condition for forwards at D = 0 increases.
If forwards are oﬀered at a price pY = E [p˜αY ] /E
£
p˜α−1Y
¤
for which
risk-neutral agents are indiﬀerent, the slope at D = 0 is zero for σ = 1.
Hence, the slope at D = 0 for risk averse agents, for whom σ < 1, is
positive, expected utility is maximized atD > 0. They will buy forward
contracts. ¤
6.2. Equation (1.20). We start with the first-order condition
(1.19), E
·³
e
P (.)
´σ−1
pY −(1+r)χ−pY
P (.)
¸
= 0. Since we consider σ = 1,
the first term within the brackets equals one and the first order con-
dition reads, inserting the Cobb-Douglas price index presented after
(1.13), E
h
pY −(1+r)χ−pY
Φpα
X
p1−α
Y
i
= 0. As X is the numeraire, dividing by p1−αY
and simplifying gives E
£
pαY −
¡
(1 + r)χ+ pY
¢
pα−1Y
¤
= 0 ⇔ E [pαY ] =¡
(1 + r)χ+ pY
¢
E
£
pα−1Y
¤
. Solving for pY yields equation (1.20) in the
text.
6.3. Proofs for option theorems.
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Proof of Theorem 4. For χ = 0 and in the steady state, we
always have
E
£
v0
¡
e˜, P
¡
pX , p˜Y
¢¢¤
> 0,
regardless of the choice of D. Since utility is increasing in consumption
and consumption is increasing in D, it is optimal to demand an infinite
amount. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5. We prove this by contradiction. First
note that for an interior solution to the optimal choice of D, we need
to have the first order conditions fulfilled. If we subtract (1.14) from
(1.21), all expressed for the steady state, we arrive at the following
expression, Z pY
o
v0
µ
(1 + r) (w − χD)
P (pX , p˜Y )
¶
−χ (1 + r)
P (pX , p˜Y )
dP Y
=
Z pY
o
v0
µ
e˜
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¶ ¡
p˜Y − pY
¢
− χ (1 + rt+1)
P (pX , p˜Y )
dP Y .
It cannot be true for the same set of parameters. This establishes that
the two first order conditions cannot hold simultaneously. Moreover,
this makes clear thatZ pY
o
v0
µ
(1 + r) (w − χD)
P (pX , p˜Y )
¶
−χ (1 + r)
P (pX , p˜Y )
dP Y
>
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for the same set of parameters. It follows thatZ pY
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p˜Y − (1 + r)χ− p¯Y
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< 0
This, together with concavity of utility in D, establishes the result. ¤
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof follows directly from (1.21) .
The first integral enters negatively, the second positively. In general,
there is a χ small enough to render the overall sum zero. ¤
6.4. Concavity of expected utility with respect to D. We
prove here the concavity of the indirect expected utility function with
respect to forwards.
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Our first order condition, i.e. the first derivative of indirect expected
utility with respect to D is given by
G (Kt, Dt, ψ) = E
·
v0
µ
et+1
P (px, pY )
¶
pYt+1 − pY − (1 + rt+1)χ
P (px, pY )
¸
= 0.
The second derivative is then simply
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¢2
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.
Since by definition v00
³
et+1
P (px,pY )
´
< 0, we integrate over negative values
and, therefore, ∂G/∂D < 0.
6.5. Balance of payment. This appendix checks consistency of
the model by validating that the overall balance of the balance of pay-
ments equals zero. Formally, EXt − IMt + CFt = 0 must hold. Then
pXXt − αetL− pXIt − (1− α) etL+
¡
pYt − pY
¢
Dt−1L− χDtL = 0⇔
pX [Xt +Kt − It]− etL− χDtL = −
¡
pYt − pY
¢
Dt−1L.
Using (1.9) for expenditure implies
pX [Xt − It]− (1 + rt) (wt−1 − χDt−1)L−
¡
pYt − pY
¢
Dt−1L− χDtL
= −
¡
pYt − pY
¢
Dt−1L⇔
pX [Xt − It]− (1 + rt) (wt−1 − χDt−1)L− χDtL = 0.
We complete our proof by replacing Xt and It. Nominal investment in
our model is by (1.7) and (1.8) simply first period income reduced by
first period spending,
pXIt = (wt − χDt)L− (1− δ) pXKt. (1.26)
The capital stock in the period after saving is given by (1.4), specifically
pXKt+1 = (1− δ) pXKt + pXIt.
Noting further that, given constant returns to scale, output in period
t can be written as the sum of factor payments, i.e.
pXXt = wLt L+ w
K
t Kt, (1.27)
we can proceed as follows:
wLt L+ w
K
t Kt − (wt − χDt)L+ (1− δ) pXKt
− (1 + rt) (wt−1 − χDt−1)L− χDtL = 0⇔
wKt Kt + (1− δ) pXKt −
µ
1 +
∂Xt
∂Kt
− δ
¶
(wt−1 − χDt−1)L = 0⇔
pX
∂Xt
∂Kt
Kt −
µ
∂Xt
∂Kt
− δ
¶
pXKt − δpXKt = 0⇔ 0 = 0,
where we made use of (1.2), (1.15) and (1.10).

CHAPTER 2
International Capital Flows meet Corporate
Liquidity Demand
There is a huge literature on corporate liquidity demand.
The implications of this theory for international macro,
however, are poorly studied. We extend the Holmstroem-
Tirole (1998) model on corporate liquidity demand to a
two country world. Introducing dual agency problems as
well as diﬀering agency costs allows us to link the share
of foreign capital holdings with the extent of liquidity
shock resistance of the domestic economy. When capi-
tal is scarce, a higher share of foreign capital implies a
more vulnerable domestic economy. Thus countries that
want to open up their capital account face a trade-oﬀ:
a higher level of investment versus an increased vulnera-
bility with respect to liquidity shocks. We find that less
developed countries are more severely aﬀected by this
trade-oﬀ and are thus more likely to resort to policy in-
struments such as capital controls. We further show that
domestic capital scarcity will place restrictions on foreign
capital inflows. The smaller the domestic capital base,
the smaller the amount of foreign capital that can be
attracted. This explains why most international capital
flows occur between rich countries and oﬀers a fresh view
on the missing catch-up predicted in neoclassical growth
models.
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1. Introduction
1There is a quite extensive literature on corporate liquidity demand.
This literature explains the failure of the financial markets to provide
suﬃcient liquidity in times of crisis using assumptions and modeling
devices like asymmetric information, principal agents structure, moral
hazard and adverse selection.2 In this sense these model have a strong
industrial organizations and contract theory background and it is not
surprising that most of these models are micro models. Questions that
have been posed (and answered) are, for example, "What is the role of
the government in supplying liquidity?" Holmstroem and Tirole (1998),
"What are the implications of the distribution of wealth for invest-
ment?" Holmstroem and Tirole (1997) and "What are asset prices like
under liquidity constraints?" Holmstroem and Tirole (2001). On the
macro level, however, applications of the main results of this litera-
ture are hard to find. The most prominent model here is perhaps the
Kyotaki-Moore model (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) that does not deal
with liquidity demand directly but rather assumes it, by introducing
a Leontief technology. Firms thus produce using two types of capital,
using the illiquid one as collateral to borrow against. Other examples
that use elements of corporate liquidity demand in a macro context
are Bernake, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996). Here liquidity demand is brought into the picture by focusing
on the financing decision of a firm that uses two types of capital: fixed
installed and a variable form. This demand in turn is used to link
micro conditions, i.e. a weak financial sector or a low net-worth, with
macroeconomic performance. Overall, however, we find that the im-
plications of the findings of this strand of literature for international
macro, although interesting and of high relevance, are poorly studied
and rarely used in macro models. In particular, the specific form of
liquidity that is modelled by Holmstroem and Tirole has to date, to
the best of our knowledge, not been brought into a macro framework.
The present work brings the sound micro structure of the corporate
liquidity demand models into a framework that is suited to address
macroeconomic questions. To this end, we extend the Holmstroem-
Tirole (see Holmstroem and Tirole (1998)) model to allow for inter-
national capital movements. First we study the implications for the
second-best contract if the home country is in autarky and investment
1I wish to thank Udo Broll, Guido Lorenzoni, Sara Maioli, Alberto Pozzolo, Uwe
Vollmer, Benjamin Weigert and seminar participants at the Ente "Luigi Einaudi,
the IWH Halle and the GEP Nottingham for discussion and helpful comments.
Most of the paper was written while I was enjoying the hospitality of the Ente
"Luigi Einaudi" in Rome.
2Bengt Holmstroem and Jean Tirole have been very important for this liter-
ature. Main contributions include Holmstroem and Tirole (1996), (1997), (1998)
and (1999).
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resources are scarce. This will lead to a redistribution of the net-social
surplus and under some additional conditions to a less vulnerable econ-
omy with respect to liquidity shocks. We then introduce international
capital flows into our model. We use the concept of a dual-agency prob-
lem (for an introduction with some empirical evidence see chapter 5 in
Tirole (2002)) to distinguish between domestic and foreign investors.
Investors in general not only have a contract with the entrepreneurs
but also an implicit one with the home government that protects their
rights. Domestic interests will usually be better protected than foreign
ones. Thus foreign investors face higher agency costs when investing
abroad.
It turns out that under this setup the vulnerability of the domestic
economy with respect to liquidity shocks increases relative to the au-
tarky case: the more foreign money firms have to raise, the narrower
will be the bandwidth of feasible liquidity shocks. If a large enough liq-
uidity shock materializes, foreigners will withdraw all their money from
domestic projects, even though home investors would have remained.
Our second result is that domestic capital scarcity can be the rea-
son for limited foreign capital supply. In the context of our analysis
this amounts to saying that if the domestic economy does not have a
suﬃciently large capital base, the level of aggregate investment will be
constrained, even if there is foreign capital abundance. This result,
again, hinges on the dual-agency structure assumption, i.e. that in-
vestments made by foreigners are less well protected than those made
by domestic investors. Countries for which this result bears most rel-
evance are, of course, less developed countries that have a relatively
small capital base. Using our second result we are able to address a
broad range of questions in international economics and growth theory,
for example the phenomenon that most capital flows occur between rich
countries (Lucas (1990)) or the missing catch-up that is predicted in
neoclassical growth models.
We see our work as contribution to the huge literature that dis-
cusses the eﬀects of capital account liberalization3. We show that from
a corporate liquidity demand perspective the composition of debt mat-
ters. In a world where capital is scarce a high ratio of foreign capital to
overall domestic investment renders the economy more vulnerable to
3There are a great many contributions to this literature from many diﬀerent
perspectives. The majority appears to take a growth perspective see, inter alia,
Klein (2003), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) and Singh (2003). Recent
empirical evidence is captured in Eichengreen (2001). Edison, Klein, Ricci and
Sloek (2002) provide a thourough survey. Other aspects are discussed in Bacchetta
(1992) (for the interaction of capital account liberalization and domestic financial
liberalization), Kim (2003) (on how the budget deficit is influenced by opening up
the capital account), Gruben and McLeod (2002) (on inflation dampening eﬀects)
and Bartolini and Drazen (1997) (the information content of policies regarding the
capital account).
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liquidity shocks. Thus the good that international capital flows bring
about, i.e. in the context of our analysis an increased level of invest-
ment, also has some severe side eﬀects. This side eﬀects are especially
strong in countries that either receive a lot of foreign capital (relative to
domestic capital) or suﬀer from particularly high agency costs for for-
eign investors (or both). Natural candidates for this type of countries
are, again, less developed countries, which renders the results of our
work relevant for the discussion about globalization and may provide
a rationale why capital controls are a widespread policy instrument in
this group of countries.
The results of our work match quite well with recent findings in the
empirical literature on the eﬀects of capital account liberalization. If
we were to use the classification of the World Bank for low, middle and
high income countries, our results would predict that most of the bene-
fits of capital account liberalization accrue to middle income countries.
The reason for this is that low income countries would only have re-
stricted access to foreign capital and high income countries would have
a suﬃciently large capital base to begin with. This is in accordance
to recent findings that point to an inverted U-shape distribution of
the gains from capital account liberalization, i.e. low and high income
countries gaining insignificantly in the process. This view is voiced, for
example, in Klein (2003) and Edison et al. (2002).
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section will shed
some light on the workings of the Holmstroem-Tirole (HT) model that
serves as our starting and reference point throughout. The second
section then extends the HT-model. The first extension deals with the
implications of the HT-model under autarky. The following section
derives the main results of our work under free capital flows. In the next
section we turn to discuss the severity of the assumptions with respect
to the investment levels and show that foreign capital scarcity may arise
without limits placed by foreigners. Section four then turns to discuss
the empirical implications of our model and section five concludes.
2. The workings of the Holmstroem-Tirole model
In what follows we will devote some space to replicate and illustrate
some of the results of the original HT-model. Our analysis will draw
heavily on this results, therefore we discuss them in some length. We
make use of the notation of the original paper. This will facilitate
understanding for readers already familiar with this class of models.
2.1. Description of the model. The economy is populated by
two types of agents: entrepreneurs (or firms) and investors (or con-
sumers). There is a continuum of entrepreneurs with unit mass. Holm-
stroem and Tirole assume that all entrepreneurs possess a constant
returns technology so the assumption of identical endowments for each
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firm can be made. The discussion will then be, of course, in terms of the
representative entrepreneur. The model has three periods. In period t0
the entrepreneurs can begin a project that pays oﬀ a return R in period
t2 if it succeeds and nothing in case of failure. To start the project, the
entrepreneurs require funds. There are two sources of these funds in
the model: inside finance, i.e. the endowment of the entrepreneurs A
and outside finance, i.e. what the investors have to add to A in order
to reach the overall amount of investment I. In t2 the project, in the
case of success, thus pays out RI. In period t1 there is a liquidity shock
ρ that requires the investors to pay an additional amount ρI for the
project to be continued - there is no further endowment the entrepre-
neurs have, i.e. no second period endowment. The liquidity shock is
stochastic and follows a density function f (ρ). If the liquidity shock
cannot be paid, the project is terminated and pays oﬀ nothing. If, in
period t1, continuation of the project is decided the entrepreneurs have
the choice about the eﬀort they put into the project. This eﬀort in
turn results in two distinct success probabilities: pH if eﬀort is exerted
and pL if they shirk, where pH > pL. There are private benefits from
shirking that accrue to the entrepreneurs of the amount BI > 0. A
necessary condition for an interior solution to this problem is that the
net present value of an investment stream (t0 = I; t1 = ρI) is positive
when eﬀort is exerted in between periods t1 and t2 (otherwise there
would not be much point in investing in the first place). Formally this
amounts to
I
Z ∞
0
max (pHR− ρ, 0) f (ρ) dρ > I. (2.1)
This condition implicitly defines the so-called first best cutoﬀ: ρ1 =
pHR. This cutoﬀ defines a range of liquidity shocks [0, ρ1] within which
continuation of the project generates a surplus and hence is socially
desirable. If in turn the entrepreneur shirks, the net present value of
the project is negative:
I
Z ∞
0
max (pLR+B − ρ, 0) f (ρ) dρ < I.
This two conditions taken together ensure that only contracts that
implement the action pH are feasible.
2.2. Solving the model. It is clear from this setup that the first-
best cutoﬀ ρ1 cannot be reached, since outside liquidity is needed in
t1 and the firms have to be promised a certain share of the expected
profits to implement the action pH . This in turn means that in t1 not
all expected unit profits can credibly be promised to outside investors,
rendering the (theoretically possible) dilution of outside claims up to
the amount ρ1 not feasible anymore. We are therefore looking for a
second-best solution. The optimal (second-best) contract specifies:
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(1) what the entrepreneurs (and hence investors) will get in case
of success: pHRf (ρ)
(2) the amount of investment undertaken in period t0: I and
(3) a state contingent rule what to do in period t1 when the shock
materializes: λ (ρ).
Formally the second-best contract solves
max
Rf (ρ),I,λ(ρ)
I
Z ∞
0
pHRf (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ−A (2.2)
s.t.
I
Z ∞
0
(pH [R−Rf (ρ)]− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ I −A
Rf (ρ) pH ≥ B +Rf (ρ) pL ∀ρ.
The first condition simply states that the entrepreneur’s goal is to max-
imize his profits. The second condition is the participation constraint
for the investors (simply a zero profit condition for the investors). This
condition will bind at the optimal solution.4 The last inequality is the
incentive compatibility constraint. This condition states that in order
for the entrepreneur not to shirk, he has to be paid a certain amount.
It later turns out that this condition will be binding as well. The op-
timal contract hence boils down to specify a cutoﬀ value ρ5 that can
be interpreted in the following way: continue if and only if ρ ≤ ρ.6
The resulting objective function of the entrepreneur can be written as
follows:7
max
ρ
Uf (ρ) = m (ρ) I (2.3)
where m (ρ) =
R ρ
0
(ρ1 − ρ) f (ρ) dρ − 1. Equation (2.3) shows the ex-
pected share of each unit of investment that the firms can appropriate
as a function of the threshold shock, i.e. the expected return per unit
of gross investment for the firm. Investors in turn will, on average,
only get their money back, which directly follows from the participa-
tion constraint holding with equality. It can be seen from (2.3) that
the objective function reaches its maximum at the first-best cutoﬀ ρ1.
Further condition (2.1) implies that m (ρ1) > 0, hence expected prof-
its will be positive. Using again the second equation of (2.2), we can
derive the optimal amount of investment:
I = k (ρ)A (2.4)
4Note that the assumed underlying utility function U = c1 + c2 + c3 is linear
and implies no discount for future consumption.
5See 6.2 for proof of the optimality of a cut-oﬀ probability.
6The proof for this is in the appendix 6.2.
7The exact derivation is relegated to appendix 6.1.
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where
k (ρ) =
1
1 +
R ρ
0
ρf (ρ) dρ− F (ρ) ρ0
.
Holmstroem-Tirole name the function k (p) the equity multiplier. It
holds in general (there is another condition necessary for that, namelyR ρo
0
(ρo − ρ) f (p) dρ < 1) that k (ρo) > 1. This in turn means that the
initial investment I is bigger than the endowment of the entrepreneurs
at the cutoﬀ ρ0, formally that I (ρ0)−A > 0. This cutoﬀ is defined as
ρo =
µ
pH −
B
pH − pL
¶
R =
µ
pH −
B
∆p
¶
R
and marks the pledegeable date 1 unit return, i.e. the amount of money
that can be in t1at most promised to outside investors, given that there
are private benefits to the entrepreneurs B that cannot be appropriated
by the outside investors. This moral hazard problem creates the short-
fall of liquidity provision from the social optimal value ρ1. The equity
multiplier can also be less than one, if the cutoﬀ value is set suﬃciently
high. This would in turn imply that in period t0 we have I − A < 0
meaning that in period t0 the entrepreneurs would not borrow. Total
investment, i.e. I−A+ρI would, of course, still be positive for otherwise
the discussion would be pointless. In their analysis Holmstroem-Tirole
rule out this possibility, i.e. they assume that I > A with the argument
that "it seems natural to have the firm a net borrower in period 0"8.
Within this very simple framework it remains to determine the
second-best cutoﬀ, i.e. the liquidity shock up to which projects are
continued. Intuitively this second best solution should be somewhere
between the first-best cutoﬀ ρ1 and the pledgeable unit return at date
t1 ρ0. This becomes clear from the following reasoning: as long as the
cutoﬀ value of the liquidity shock is chosen ρ < ρo both investors and
entrepreneurs choose to continue after the shock has materialized. If
it is chosen to be above ρ1, the net-present value of continuing the
project is negative (by condition 2.1), and it would be better to leave
the project. Within the interval things are less obvious. By lowering
the cutoﬀ the firms can increase the amount of money they can raise,
by increasing it, they can withstand higher liquidity shocks and thus
raise the marginal expected return on the initial investment, but at the
same time they decrease initial outside investment, i.e.
dk (ρ)
dρ
< 0,
dm (ρ)
dρ
> 0.
The firms choose ρ to maximize their marginal gain per unit invested,
formally
max
ρ
U (ρ) = m (ρ) k (ρ)A. (2.5)
8See Holmstroem and Tirole (1998, p. 10.), p.10.
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This cutoﬀ value ρ then is determined by the first order condition9:Z ρ
o
F (ρ) dρ = 1. (2.6)
and hence gives an utility level of
UHT (ρ) =
ρ1 − ρ
ρ− ρo
A. (2.7)
The following picture captures the basic properties of the second-
best contract of the HT-world:
6
-
ρ
f(ρ)
Liquidity Shock and Cutoff V alues
ρ0 ρ¯ ρ1
Figure 1: The Holmstroem-Tirole Model graphically
Figure 1 shows as an example a particular distribution of a liquid-
ity shock. Three cutoﬀ values are depicted, ρ0, ρ and ρ1. If no con-
tract would be set up beforehand, entrepreneurs would "overinvest"
and could not, once in period t1 raise more than ρ0I, i.e. the expected
net-worth of the project minus private benefit payments. If negotia-
tions were to take place (and implementation issues were solved) in
period t0, investment per project would be less, however, due to the
increased equity quota, the range of feasible liquidity shocks would in-
crease and hence ρI could be raised in period t1. However, the first-best
outcome ρ1 cannot be implemented.
2.3. Properties of the second-best contract. From equation
(2.7) it becomes clear that the higher the first-best threshold, the higher
is the return of investment for the entrepreneurs. Also, higher inside
benefits B that accrue only to the entrepreneurs, will reduce their re-
turn (via lowering the equity multiplier). These results are more or
less standard and not overly surprising. Holmstroem-Tirole point to
another, more surprising result: if the distribution of the liquidity shock
becomes riskier (in the sense of a mean preserving spread), the cutoﬀ
9The necessary steps to derive (2.6) are in the appendix .
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will go down. This can be seen from (2.6). Profits, however, will go
up. This is a consequence of the fact that the option to terminate the
project becomes more valuable when the distribution is more risky.
3. Introducing international capital flows
We are now in the position to extend the HT-analysis to a macro
framework. We consider a two open country setup, where both, home
and foreign are also Holmstroem-Tirole worlds. This essentially means
that the capital allocation is ruled by the same principles as outlined
above. Our crucial assumption, however, will be that there are not
enough funds in the home country to meet the period t0 investment
demand
ID (ρ) = k (ρ)A
where ρ is the second-best cutoﬀ in the unconstrained HT-world. This
shortfall of investment supply can thought of being either a result from
domestic portfolio optimization or capital scarcity (or both). With free
capital flows this shortfall of domestic investment supply will (at least
partially) be matched by capital inflows. In contrast, under autarky
this is not possible, the optimal solution of our Holmstroem-Tirole
world will be diﬀerent: the cutoﬀ ρ goes up. We derive the behavior of
the HT-world under autarky and capital scarcity in detail below. We
then turn to analyze our two country world with free capital flows.
3.1. Autarky. A natural starting point for our analysis is to con-
sider the implications of the HT-model under autarky. Autarky itself
is only interesting if we have
IH ≤ ID (ρ)−A = (k (ρ)− 1)A (2.8)
where IH10 is the exogenously given amount of investment home in-
vestors are willing (or able) to undertake and ID denotes the amount
of investment that would prevail in an unconstrained world. In princi-
ple we could think of the investment-shortfall IH − ID (ρ) + A as also
being dependent on the parameter vector of the domestic economy,
however, to keep matters simple we simply assume this excess demand
for investments. The original HT-world result will now be altered. As
long as there were, by assumption, enough funds to meet any arising in-
vestment demand, the investors got zero expected returns. This result
was brought about by the assumptions of risk neutrality, the absence
of time preference of the investors and the zero returns of the outside
asset cash. Investors would then compete away any positive profit -
hence the net-social surplus accrues to the entrepreneurs. With lim-
ited outside funds, however, this result changes. Now the entrepreneurs
compete for the limited funds and investors will be able to appropriate
10Note that in order to distinguish fixed quantities from quantities that are
variables we use the bar, hence I denotes a fixed amount as opposed to I.
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a part or all of the net-social surplus. Formally the optimal contract
now solves
max
Rf (ρ),λ(ρ),I
I
Z ∞
0
(pH [R−Rf (ρ)]− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− I +A
s.t
Rf (ρ) pH ≥ B +Rf (ρ) pL ∀ρ
I
Z ∞
0
pHRf (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ A
I ≤ IH +A
Note the similarity of this program to the HT-model optimization prob-
lem. First of all, what was the participation constraint of the entrepre-
neurs now is the objective function. Secondly, the incentive compati-
bility constraint remains unaltered. There is now a new participation
constraint relevant for the investors. The only new part is the capacity
constraint, i.e. that investments undertaken cannot be greater than an
exogenously given amount IH + A. Two cases that arise out of this
optimization problem can now be distinguished: IpH B∆pF
¡
ρA
¢
> A
and IpH B∆pF
¡
ρA
¢
≤ A. We will analyze each case in turn.
3.1.1. IpH B∆pF (ρ) > A. If this condition were to hold, entrepre-
neurs would be able to get a part of the net social surplus, as they will
recover more than their initial investment, implying a rate of interest
above zero. The optimization problem then reduces to
max
ρA
I
Z ρA
0
(pH [R−Rf (ρ)]− ρ) f (ρ) dρ− I +A.
where ρA refers to the cutoﬀ value under autarky. It is easy to see that
letting ρ = ρo = pH [R − Rf (ρ)] maximizes this expression. However,
this case is in the original paper assumed away by the conditionZ ρ0
0
(ρ0 − ρ) f (ρ) dρ < 1,
i.e. that investors would realize a negative expected return on their
investment. Holmstroem and Tirole in the original paper stress that
without this condition investment would be self-financing and the prob-
lem under consideration would be trivial. Without this condition, the
allowable liquidity shock in t1 would always be less than the pledge-
able income and thus financing it can always be achieved by diluting
capital.11 Hence, this case must be excluded from the set of possible
solutions.
11Any investor who has a share in the project and is oﬀered the alternative of
a complete loss will up to the amount ρ0I be willing to invest additional funds in
order to recover at least a part of his initial investment. This amount to dilution
of initial period t0 claims.
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3.1.2. IpH B∆pF (ρ) ≤ A . Under this condition entrepreneurs now
simply get a zero expected return on their investment A. Since the
moral hazard constraint will always be binding, ρ adjusts to ρA so
as to bring about IpH B∆pF
¡
ρA
¢
= A. To see this, simply note that
entrepreneurs would not start projects with negative expected return
but instead keep their initial endowment for themselves. Hence
IpH
R ρA
0
B
∆pf (ρ) dρ = A must always hold. The second-best contract
under autarky and capital scarcity will thus specify an optimal cutoﬀ
value ρA following the program:
max
ρA,Rf (ρ),I
I
ÃZ ρA
0
(pHR− ρ) f (ρ) dρ− 1
!
(2.9)
s.t.
I ≤ IH +AZ ρA
0
Rf (ρ) f (ρ) dρ =
A
IH +A
1
pH
.
Note that the solution to this program always implies that the entre-
preneurs get an expected return of zero on their investment. Further,
if I
R ρ
0
pH B∆pf (ρ) dρ < A, there would be in principle two ways to im-
plement the participation constraint of the entrepreneurs: increase the
payment to the entrepreneurs, i.e. chose Rf (ρ) > B∆p or increase ρ for
F (ρ) is increasing in ρ. Clearly, there is no incentive for the investors
to give more away than absolutely necessary, hence ρ will increase and
the payments for the entrepreneurs will remain B∆p . The investors will
be able to appropriate the full net-social surplus. In this sense this
solution is exactly the opposite of the original HT-world solution.
From the perspective of the original HT-world solution, two cases
have to be distinguished: IpH B∆pF (ρ) = A and IpH
B
∆pF (ρ) < A. In
the first case the solution to (2.9) is ρA = ρ, just as in the HT-world.
However, due to the restricted amount of investment, the overall utility
will be strictly less than in the unrestricted world. We have
UA < UHT 12
with
UA =
ρ1 − ρ
ρ1 − ρ0
A <
ρ1 − ρ
ρ− ρo
A = UHT . (2.10)
The solution for the second case is then simply a cutoﬀ value ρA that
solves:
F
¡
ρA
¢
=
A
IH +A
∆p
BpH
∀ρ ≤ ρ1.
A diﬀerent way of stating the results under autarky is the following
graphic:
12Appendix 6.3 derives this solution in more detail.
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Figure 2: The Autarky Case
Figure 2 above makes clear that forcing the economy to overall
invest less, expands the range of admissible liquidity shocks from ρ to
ρA. Thus, even though the economy as a whole invests less, a greater
proportion of projects will survive any given liquidity shock. Hence the
economy becomes less vulnerable with respect to liquidity shocks.
We conclude the discussion of the autarky solution of the HT-model
with the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In a HT-model under autarky the following holds
true: The representative firm with endowment A will invest I
¡
ρA
¢
=
k
¡
ρA
¢
A < I (ρ). The second-best cutoﬀ under autarky ρA will lie in
the interval [ρ, ρ1). For suﬃciently small values of IH = I
¡
ρA
¢
− A
we will have ρA > ρ. In that situation the domestic economy will be
less vulnerable with respect to liquidity shocks. This comes at the cost
of a smaller scale for each and every project. The net-social surplus
accrues to the investors. The utility level that can be reached upon
implementation of the second-best contract is strictly less than in the
original HT-world.
3.2. Free capital flows. In this section we will introduce the pos-
sibility that foreigners can (and will) add some amount IF to make up
for (some of) the shortfall of investment supply to investment demand.
Hence we have
IF ≤ ID (ρ)− IH −A.
Foreign investors will be investing their money under exactly the same
conditions as home investors with one exception: in the spirit of a
dual agency problem (see Tirole (2002)) we introduce higher agency
costs, that is a diﬀerent B for foreign investors.13 The main implication
13There is a literature of its own that concludes that the amount B is indeed
country specific. For example Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002)
tries to assess the influence this diﬀerences have on corporate valuation and Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) identifies four diﬀerent legal systems,
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of this assumption is that foreigners will face a diﬀerent pledgeable
income in period t1 than home investors. This can be justified on
grounds of several reasons. The first that comes to mind are monitoring
costs. Even though not explicitly modelled here, one could think of the
amount of private benefits that accrue only to the firm also as being
the outcome of a monitoring process - the more eﬃcient the latter the
lesser the former. It is reasonable to assume that foreigners possess a
less eﬃcient monitoring technology. Secondly, there is the dual agency
perspective. Foreign investors do not only have a contract with the
firms they invest in, but also, implicitly, with the home government that
sets the rules (bankruptcy laws etc.) within its domain. There may be
a tendency in case of failure of the firm to protect home interests more
eﬃcient than foreign ones. From this we conjecture that BF > B, i.e.
that the firm will need more from foreign investors to be kept diligent.
Recently there have been contributions that endogenize the choice of B
by the government (see for example Tirole (2003)) and in general this
would be possible in our model as well. To keep matters simple here,
however, we stick with the assumed exogenous nature of the agency
costs. The analysis of the economy under free capital movements bears
close resemblance with the setups discussed above. To use our previous
results we need to clarify and discuss in turn the diﬀerent cases that can
arise when foreign capital is allowed to augment the domestic capital
stock. In what follows we will abstract from exchange rate issues or
terms of trade uncertainty. Home and foreign thus share the same
commodity that is not subject to any change in its price. Further, as
outlined above, home and foreign agents have the same utility function,
namely U (c0, c1, c2) = c0+c1+c2. If agents decide to simply hold their
endowments without investing them returns will be zero, there is a
loss-free storage technology. The minimum expected return for any
investor (and entrepreneur) in this model is therefore zero and cannot
be less. In order to gain clarity over the implications of the model we
distinguish in what follows two diﬀerent cases. Both cases, of course,
involve domestic capital scarcity, but in the first the additional capital
that is provided from abroad is suﬃcient to bridge the gap between
demand and supply. In the second case we will discuss the implications
if capital scarcity as measured by the gap IF +IH < I (ρ)−A remains,
even with foreign capital flowing in.
3.2.1. IF + IH > I (ρ)−A. If the supply of foreign capital is large
enough, capital scarcity no longer exists and, from a contractual point
of view we are back in the original HT-world. The net-social surplus
each with a diﬀerent degree of investor protection. Finally Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) finds that countries with lower investor protection tend
to have narrower capital markets.
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then accrues to the entrepreneurs. The second-best contract solves
max
RH(ρ),IH ,IF ,λ(ρ),RF (ρ)
αI
Z ∞
0
pHRH (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ (2.11)
+(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
pHRF (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ−A
s.t.
αI
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ IH
(2.12)
(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ IF .
(2.13)
RH (ρ) pH ≥ B +RH (ρ) pL ∀ρ (2.14)
RF (ρ) pH ≥ BF +RF (ρ) pL ∀ρ (2.15)
IH ≤ IH (2.16)
where α = IHI−A the denotes the share of domestic outside capital rela-
tive to total outside capital and the overall level of investment is given
by I = IF + IH + A. Note that in order to make the description of
the optimization problem complete we need to introduce two types of
returns here: the entrepreneur will get RH (ρ) for the investment that
is financed with domestic outside money and RF (ρ) for the foreign
financed part. If the project is successful, investors will share the pro-
ceeds R − αRH − (1− α)RF according to their respective shares in
the investment. This is what constitutes the left hand side of equa-
tions (2.12) and (2.13). The implicit assumption in writing this type
of contract is that every project is financed in part by foreigners and
in part by domestic investors (joint-venture). Clearly, an alternative
to that assumption is that a certain share of all projects will receive
finance from domestic investors and the remainder will receive foreign
outside funding (pure-origin finance). Mathematically, both problems
are equivalent.14 In this section we therefore restrict the discussion to
the aforementioned case. The implications for the vulnerability of the
domestic economy with respect to liquidity shocks, however, are quite
diﬀerent under each setup and will be discussed in more detail below.
The solution to program (2.11) is the same as in the original HT-
world and specifies a cutoﬀ value ρ15. This is not surprising as the only
parameter that has changed is the composition of the net-social surplus.
Note also that the diﬀerence in agency costs does not directly matter
here. This, at the first glance, slightly strange result follows from the
independence of the optimal cutoﬀ ρ from ρF0 < ρo < ρ < ρ1 as long
14This is shown in the Appendix (6.5).
15A detailed derivation can be found in the appendix 6.4.1.
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as it does not hit one of this boundaries. However, this independence
is not complete. The higher agency costs that foreigner face will place
a constraint on the equity multiplier - i.e. equation 2.4 - for this type
of capital. Depending on the parameters of the economy, especially
the amount of domestically provided outside capital and the size of the
endowment of the entrepreneurs, there may well be endogenous foreign
capital scarcity. We will in a later section analyze this case in more
detail, i.e. under which conditions the increased BF is going to induce
foreigners to limit their investments.
The level of utility that can be reached is lower than in the original
HT-model. This follows directly from the assumption of the higher
agency costs foreigner investors face and the implicit restriction on the
size of the projects. Formally this is stated below
UFA =
ρ1 − ρ
ρ− (αρ0 + (1− α) ρF0 )
A < UHT
where ρF0 = pH
³
R− BF∆p
´
< ρ0. Program (2.11) has 5 choice variable
but only 4 restrictions, since the second and third equation are equiv-
alent. Hence without a further condition, α remains undetermined
within the bounds defined by IH . However, as argued above the size
of the domestic capital base restricts the maximum amount of foreign
capital that will flow into the domestic economy, especially implying
that α will never fall to zero. This together with the result that entre-
preneurs will seek a share of outside finance as high as possible provides
the last restriction on our optimization problem. This is, of course, an
artefact of the linear objective function. For the purposes of this work
it is suﬃcient to note that the composition of outside debt is not vital
for our main results as long as we assume parameter values for which
there will always be both, foreign and domestic outside finance.
The results of this section are summarized by the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. In a HT-model with domestic capital scarcity de-
fined as ID (ρ)−A > IH, international capital flows and foreign capital
abundance defined as IF > I (ρ) − IH − A the following holds true:
The second-best contract has the same properties as in the original
HT-model, namely firms invest ID (ρ) = k (ρ)A, the net-social sur-
plus accrues to the entrepreneurs and investors break even. The utility
level that entrepreneurs can reach will be lower than in the original
HT-model.
3.2.2. IF +IH ≤ I (ρ)−A . We now turn to determine the second-
best contract under both domestic and foreign capital scarcity. Similar
to the analysis under autarky, this situation again calls for a diﬀerent
approach. The first implication is, of course, a redistribution of the
domestic net-social surplus in favor of the investors. At the first glance
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it seems as if there are now two second-best programs to be solved, one
for the domestic investors and the second for the foreign ones.:
max
RH(ρ),λH(ρ),IH
αI
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λH (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− IH
(2.17)
s.t.
αI
Z ∞
0
pHRH (ρ)λ
H (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥
µ
IH
I −A
¶
A
RH (ρ) pH ≥ B +RH (ρ) pL ∀ρ
IH ≤ IH (2.18)
The program for the foreign capital then reads
max
RF (ρ),λF (ρ),IF
(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λF (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− IF
(2.19)
s.t.
(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
pHRF (ρ)λ
F (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥
µ
IF
I −A
¶
A
RF (ρ) pH ≥ BF +RF (ρ) pL ∀ρ
IF ≤ IF .
However, merging the two maximization problems into one is mathe-
matically equivalent and leads to the same results. The solution tech-
nique employed is the same as in section (3.1.2). First we observe that
any meaningful solution must involve binding incentive compatibility
constraints, i.e. RF = B
F
∆p and RH =
BH
∆p . Secondly the cutoﬀ values
have to adjust to fulfill the participation constraint of the entrepre-
neurs. This implies in general two diﬀerent cutoﬀ values for home and
foreign investment contracts respectively. To see this write out the two
participation constraints as
F
¡
ρH
¢
=
1
I
A
B
∆p
pH
(2.20)
and
F
¡
ρF
¢
=
1
I
A
BF
∆p
pH
.16 (2.21)
The first implication is that contracts with foreigners will always have
a lower cutoﬀ value than contracts with domestic investors. In this
setup this result is completely driven by the assumption of the higher
agency costs that foreigners face and the fulfillment requirement of the
participation constraint. The second implication is that under free (but
limited) capital inflows the domestic contract cutoﬀ value will be less
16The exact derivation is again relegated to appendix (6.4.2).
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than under autarky as long as foreigners contribute a small fraction of
the domestic capital stock. Condition (2.20) makes this immediately
clear.
The resulting contracts under all our setups considered are depicted
for reference in the table below:
Free Capital Flows Contract Home Investors
ID (ρ)−A ≤ IH {ρ, I (ρ) , Rf = B∆p}
ID (ρ)−A > IH , ID (ρ)−A < IH + IF (ρ) {ρ, I, RH = B∆p}
ID (ρ)−A > I, ID (ρ)−A ≥ IH + IF {ρH , I, RH = B∆p}
Contract Foreign Investors
ID (ρ)−A ≤ IH -
ID (ρ)−A > IH , ID (ρ)−A < IH + IF (ρ) {ρ, IF
¡
ρ, I
¢
, RF = B
F
∆p }
ID (ρ)−A > I, ID (ρ)−A ≥ IH + IF {ρF , IF , RF = BF∆p }
The implications of our results are straightforward. Foreign capital
inflows will render the domestic economy more vulnerable to liquidity
shocks. This eﬀect has two sources. The first is the share of foreign
capital invested in domestic firms, the second is the higher agency
costs that foreign investors face. We can decompose these two sources
by comparing the diﬀerent cutoﬀ values that prevail in an economy
with foreign and domestic capital with another with the same level of
investment but only domestic capital:
IF
I −Aρ
F +
IH
I −Aρ
H < ρA|I−A=IH+IF = ρ
H (2.22)
| ¡ρF − ρH¢ IF
I −A | = FCCP > 0.
Relationship (2.22) defines a "foreign capital cutoﬀ premium" (FCCP)
and makes clear that the higher the share of foreign outside finance
in domestic firms, the higher the premium the economy pays in terms
of increased vulnerability. What is depicted in (2.22) is thus the ef-
fect stemming from the share of foreign capital, for any given ratio B
F
B
multiplied by
¡
ρF − ρH
¢
that stands for the direct contribution of the
diﬀering agency costs to the higher vulnerability of the domestic econ-
omy with respect to liquidity shocks. Note that the impact of a given
liquidity shocks also depends on whether firms seek outside finance as
a joint-venture or as pure-origin. Under joint venture the impact is the
greatest, if we assume that projects cannot be divided, implying that
all projects that experience a liquidity shock higher than ρF are aban-
doned. Under pure-origin finance only a fraction (1− α) of all projects
is subject to this lower threshold, the remainder being continued up to
ρH .
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Figure 3: Free Capital Flows
Figure 3 states (one of) the results under free capital flows graph-
ically. The thick dotted line represents the reference point ρ of our
benchmark HT-world. As the above analysis made clear, international
capital flows will, under certain conditions, lead to two distinct cutoﬀ
values: ρH for domestic outside capital and ρF for the foreign counter-
part. The part of the project (or the part of the projects, depending on
pure origin vs. joint-venture finance) that is financed from abroad will
only be continued up to liquidity shocks of ρF . This will, in general,
be less than ρ and thus be worse than in an otherwise comparable HT-
world. The domestically financed part will be better protected than
the part that is financed from abroad. Whether or not the domes-
tically financed part is even better protected than it would be in the
benchmark HT-world (as shown in Figure 3) depends on the parameter
vector of the model.
The following proposition sums up the results of this section:
Proposition 3. In a HT-model with domestic capital scarcity de-
fined as ID (ρ)−A > IH, international capital flows and foreign capital
scarcity as defined by ID (ρ)− IH−A > IF the following hold true: the
representative firm invests I = IH + IF + A < ID (ρ), the net-social
surplus now accrues to domestic and foreign investors, the second-best
contract specifies two distinct cutoﬀ values, one for the foreign investors
ρF and one for the domestic investors ρH where ρF < ρH < ρA. The
domestic economy is thus more vulnerable to liquidity shocks than un-
der autarky, i.e. a larger part of the firms will have to abandon the
project in period t1 for any given liquidity shock ρ > ρ0.
3.3. Domestic capital scarcity versus international capital
flows. To derive our results, we so far had to make some strong as-
sumptions on the relative size of capital supply to demand without
giving a justification for the respective sizes. It turns out, however,
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that even if we stick with the exogenous nature of the size of the out-
side capital, we can say a bit more about the relevant ranges. Consider
equation (2.4) that serves as our benchmark throughout the analysis.
This equation determines the second-best capital stock in an other-
wise unconstrained world. Hence it yields the amount of investment
in the HT-model that maximizes the expected (second-best) net-social
surplus. The term 1
1+
R ρ
0 ρf(ρ)dρ−F (ρ)ρ0
is called (by Holmstroem and Ti-
role) equity multiplier and is in the original HT-model assumed to be
greater than 1. Under free capital flows there are two scenarios that
are of interest. First we consider domestic capital scarcity and foreign
capital abundance. This, as stated in section (3.2.1), implies a contract
{ρ, IH , IF (ρ) , RH = B∆p , RF = B
F
∆p }. The properties of this contract are
the same as in the HT-model, with the exception that foreigners face a
smaller period t1 pledgeable income as do home investors. In order for
this contract to be feasible, we need the following condition to hold
IF (ρ) ≤
1
1 +
R ρ
0
ρf (ρ) dρ− F (ρ) ρF0
A−A (2.23)
IF (ρ) ≤ IF (ρ)−A,
where IF (ρ) denotes the level of investment that would prevail in a
world in which all investors were foreigners. Clearly, as ρFo < ρo by
assumption, we have ID (ρ) > IF (ρ). This places a restriction on
the term "foreign capital abundance" in the sense that foreign capital
cannot indefinitely augment the domestic economy, even if there is no
shortage in foreign supply. This in turn renders our results from section
(3.2.2), the second case we considered, more relevant: foreign capital
scarcity, as we defined it, will not only follow from a lack of foreign
supply but also from an especially low domestic capital base. To see
this, note that the overall level of initial outside investment demand
under free capital flows was given by ID (ρ) − A = IH + IF (ρ). For
small enough values of IH , however, constraint (2.23) will be binding
and thus we face domestic and foreign capital scarcity even though
there is no restriction placed on the level of foreign capital from outside.
The reason for this "self-restriction" of the model are the diﬀerent (and
higher) agency costs foreigners face. The higher these costs are, relative
to the costs domestic investors face, the earlier this "self-restriction"
is going to bind. Further, the higher this relative agency costs are,
the greater the "distance", as measured by ρH − ρF , between domestic
and foreign contracts. Formally the constraint on the level of domestic
outside investment reads
IH <
¡
k (ρ)− kF (ρ)
¢
A (2.24)
46 International Capital Flows meet Corporate Liquidity Demand
where k (ρ) is the equity multiplier of the original HT-model and kF (ρ)
is the equity multiplier that would prevail in the case in which all out-
side finance would be stemming from abroad. Condition (2.24) states
that if domestic outside capital supply fails in making up for the diﬀer-
ence between unconstrained investment demand and maximum foreign
outside capital, foreign outside capital will be restricted endogenously.
Note that the endowment has a diﬀerent role. In general, as (2.24)
makes clear, the smaller the domestic endowments, the smaller the do-
mestic outside capital supply must be in order to induce foreign capital
scarcity (and vice versa). This is, of course, a pure demand eﬀect. The
higher the endowment, the higher is the demand for outside capital.
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In a HT-model with international capital flows do-
mestic outside capital scarcity may induce foreign capital scarcity. This
will be the case when the amount of domestic outside finance investors
are willing (or able) to invest falls short of the diﬀerence between the
investment level that would prevail in an unconstrained world and the
amount of outside finance foreigners will be willing to provide at given
agency costs. The resulting second-best contract in this situation is the
one described in section (3.2.2).
4. Empirical implications
Our extensions to the original HT model have some interesting em-
pirical implications. According to our results, depending on the domes-
tic capital base, countries may have limited scope for borrowing abroad.
Naturally, the poorer the country under consideration, the lower the
domestic capital base and hence the more limited its borrowing poten-
tial will be. This in turn would imply that the eﬀects of international
capital flows on poor countries are ambiguous in our model. As the
analysis in section (3.2.2) makes clear the positive eﬀect of augmenting
the domestic capital base has the (potentially) negative side eﬀect of
rendering the domestic economy more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
The final evaluation thus depends on the distribution of the liquidity
shocks. On the other hand, rich countries that are capital abundant
to begin with, will not gain anything from opening their capital ac-
count, the original HT-contract remains in place unaltered. However,
the main eﬀects of international capital flows according to our model
will occur in the middle-income group of countries, i.e. those countries
that have an insuﬃcient capital base to begin with but that can sig-
nificantly augment their capital base with the help of foreign capital
inflows. If this augmentation is complete (in the sense that the com-
plete excess demand for outside capital can be contracted abroad), only
gains will accrue. In the case of incomplete augmentation it remains
unclear whether there will be any gains or not.
5 Conclusion 47
It is clear that our model does not account for all possible motives
of international capital flows. Hence it will, in general, not be able
to explain all these flows between countries nor the empirical findings
often found in studies on the subject. What is remarkable, however, is
the model’s ability to rationalize two main findings of the empirical lit-
erature in the field. First, recent studies on the eﬀect of international
capital flows on growth find, although far from conclusive, evidence
that the growth eﬀects of capital account liberalization are distributed
in a U-shape manner (see Klein (2003) and Edison et al. (2002)). The
main gains accrue to middle-income countries with poor and rich coun-
tries benefitting only marginally. This is in line with the predictions
of our model. Secondly, it has become a stylized fact that most net-
capital flows occur between developed countries, much the opposite to
what neoclassical growth theory would predict.17 Our model oﬀers a
very simple explanation for this: Poor countries do not have enough
collateral to borrow up to their needs. They are in eﬀect credit con-
strained.
With respect to income volatility our analysis bears another em-
pirical implication. As a result of foreign capital inflows, the poorest
countries may witness an (relative) increase in output variability due
to the increased vulnerability with respect to liquidity shocks. How-
ever, this is only a possibility, depending on the liquidity shocks that
hit the economy that may or may not materialize. Surprisingly, al-
though many contributions to the discussion on the eﬀects of capital
account liberalization name increasing volatility as a possible negative
consequence, empirical studies on this topic are scarce. We are only
aware of two such papers, namely Bekaert et al. (2004) and Mukerji
(2003). The first (and most recent) study finds that overall the im-
pact of financial liberalization in real consumption growth volatility is
negligible. However, if we are viewing the eﬀects Bekaert et al. (2004)
find at the country level there are significant negative eﬀects for some
countries. The second study finds, in accordance with our model, neg-
ative eﬀects for less developed countries but negligible output eﬀects
for more developed countries.
5. Conclusion
In this work we extended a model of corporate liquidity demand in
order to be able to address questions of macroeconomic importance.
This was achieved by introducing international capital flows into the
model of Holmstroem and Tirole that can augment the domestic cap-
ital base. Foreign investors, as opposed to domestic ones, face higher
17Lucas (1990) in a widely cited paper draws on this point and sparked a
literature of its own on that topic. Examples of follow up papers are Kray (2000)
and Reinhardt and Rogoﬀ (2004).
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agency costs when investing in domestic firms. We justify this assump-
tion in the spirit of a dual-agency problem: principals will not only
have a contract with their agents but also an implicit one with the
authorities that set the frame for any economic activity. However, we
could think of many more possible reasons why agency costs should
be higher for foreigners, monitoring costs being one of these reasons.
The model then allows to discuss and answer several interesting ques-
tions that relate to the field of international macroeconomics, like the
phenomenon that net capital flows are substantially higher between de-
veloped countries than between developed countries and less developed
countries.
If outside capital is scarce domestically the economy will invest less
but will also be able to withstand higher liquidity shocks. Foreign
capital that flows in then brings about two eﬀects: more investments
but at the cost of higher vulnerability with respect to liquidity shocks.
This eﬀect would be especially pronounced in less developed countries.
This may provide a rationale why several countries from this group
chose to introduce capital controls as a policy option.
If outside capital is in limited supply both, from domestic investors
and foreign ones, the economy will be even more vulnerable to liquidity
shocks as the foreign share of the outside finance cannot sustain liq-
uidity shocks as high as the domestic share. The consequence is that
a larger fraction of projects will be abandoned in period t1. Foreign
outside capital in this sense is less robust than domestic outside capi-
tal. This result has some interesting implications. First, countries that
have to draw heavily on foreign capital, should try hard to lower agency
costs for foreigners. This would mitigate the negative side eﬀects for-
eign capital inflows have. To the extent that foreign outside capital
is rendered scarce by the low domestic capital base our model oﬀers
an explanation why most net-capital flows occur between developed
countries, i.e. those with a relatively high domestic capital base. Sec-
ondly, our model provides a rationale why the catch-up prediction of
neoclassical growth models does not work empirically: foreign capital
simply cannot augment the domestic capital base indefinitely. There
are two reason for this: the higher agency costs that foreign investors
end up paying and the credit rationing itself that is already part of the
original HT-model.
Our analysis has several shortcomings that could be the subject of
further research. First, the crucial point of capital scarcity is exogenous
in our model. An extension to endogenize domestic capital supply thus
seems natural. Secondly, agency costs may also be made endogenous by
introducing a government. Even though our results would not change
qualitatively, this step would allow to analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerent
policy regimes on domestic welfare. Lastly an extension of the present
framework to an overlapping generation model and thus ultimately the
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possibility to answer the question whether or not trading oﬀ vulnera-
bility against scale is worth the eﬀort may prove an exiting avenue for
further research.
6. Mathematical appendix
6.1. Derivation of the optimal HT-world contract. In this
first part of the mathematical appendix we will devote some space to
go in some detail through the steps necessary to solve the optimization
problem of the original HT-paper. We want to determine λ (ρ) , I,
Rf (ρ) that solve the second-best contract:
max
Rf (ρ),I,λ(ρ)
I
Z ∞
0
pHRf (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ−A
s.t.
I
Z ∞
0
(pH [R−Rf (ρ)]− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ I −A
Rf (ρ) pH ≥ B +Rf (ρ) pL ∀ρ.
Noting first that the second equation must hold with equality for
otherwise the solution would be unconstrained and substituting into
the objective function we get
max I
Z ∞
0
pHRf (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− I
+I
Z ∞
0
(pH [R−Rf (ρ)]− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ
=⇒ max I
µZ ∞
0
(pHR− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− 1
¶
Note the that Rf (ρ) disappears. Now making use of the cutoﬀ value
ρ, i.e. rewriting λ (ρ) as λ (ρ) =
½
1∀ρ ≤ ρ
0 otherwise
¾
we arrive at
max
ρ
I
µZ ρ
0
(pHR− ρ) f (ρ) dρ− 1
¶
Further using that pHRI = ρ1I is the social optimal cutoﬀ value we
can find the marginal net social return on investment as a more concise
objective function of the entrepreneur:
max
ρ
Uf (ρ) = m (ρ) I.
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Now using again the second equation of (2.2), we can derive the amount
of investment:
I
Z ∞
0
pH [R−Rf (ρ)− ρ]λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ = I −A
1
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ− ρoF (ρ)
A = I
k (ρ)A = I.
To determine the second-best cutoﬀ ρ we maximize (2.5) with respect
to ρ. Writing out (2.5) gives
max
ρ
U (ρ) =
F (ρ) ρ1 −
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ− 1
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ− F (ρ) ρo
A
max
ρ
U (ρ) =
ρ1 −
³
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ
´
1
F (ρ)³
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ
´
1
F (ρ) − ρo
A
= min
p
µ
1 +
Z ρ
o
ρf (ρ) dρ
¶
1
F (ρ)
.
The first-order condition for this problem is simply
R ρ∗
o F (ρ) dρ = 1,
since
d
³
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ
´
1
F (ρ)
dρ
= ρf (ρ)
1
F (ρ)
−
µ
1 +
Z ρ
o
ρf (ρ) dρ
¶
1
(F (ρ))2
f (ρ) = 0
this, together with the result that F (ρ) ρ−
R ρ
0
ρf (ρ) dρ =
R ρ
0
F (ρ) dρ
gives (2.6). Using this last equality once more in the numerator and
the denominator of (2.5) and assuming an interior solution, we finally
arrive at (2.7).
6.2. Proof of the optimality of a cutoﬀ rule. Here we prove
that λ (ρ), the state-contingent continuation policy, takes the form of
a cutoﬀ rule, i.e. continue iﬀ ρ ≤ ρ. Suppose we would propose a
continuation policy that says continue for ∀ρ. In this case we would
continue projects that have a negative net present value, hence also
those that are socially undesirably. Now suppose we would propose
a rule that no project should be continued for any positive ρ. Then,
of course, there are projects with positive net present value that are
abandoned by this rule. We can improve both situations by imposing
a cut-oﬀ value ρ upon reaching which projects are terminated. The
value of ρ is left to be determined endogenously. We can see this result
also from the concavity of the objective function of the second-best
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program with respect to a cut-oﬀ ρ:18
max
λ(ρ)
Z ∞
0
(pHR− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ.
As long as ρ is increasing but less than pHR the value of the objective
function increases. As soon as pHR is surpassed, additional contribu-
tions will be negative and hence undesirable. As long as the support of
the liquidity shock ρ comprises also of pHR it will be optimal to define
a cutoﬀ rule.
6.3. Derivation of the second best contracts under autarky.
We start solving the program (2.9) subject to the condition of the first
case: I
R ρA
0
pH B∆pf (ρ) = A. This condition states that the amount of
funds provided by the investors is such that moral hazard constraint
just binds. We can then note that this amount of investment is simply
given by
I =
A
pH B∆pF (ρ)
.
Inserting this into the first equation yields
max
ρA
A
³R ρA
0
(pHR− ρ) f (ρ) dρ− 1
´
pH B∆pF (ρ)
. (2.25)
This is equivalent to the maximization problem in the original setup,
i.e. maximizing (2.25) is equivalent to minp
³
1 +
R ρ
o ρf (ρ) dρ
´
1
F (ρ) . To
see this rewrite (2.25) as
max
ρA
ρ1F (ρ)−
R ρA
0
ρf (ρ) dρ− 1
pH B∆pF (ρ)
A
max
ρA
ρ1 −
³
1 +
R ρA
0
ρf (ρ) dρ
´
1
F (ρ)
pH B∆p
A.
The solution is thus the same as in the original HT-world, namelyR ρA
0
F (ρ) = 1. Using this and the definition of ρ0 = pH
³
R− B∆p
´
we
can rewrite utility of the investors as (2.10).
6.4. Derivation of the second-best contracts under free cap-
ital flows.
18This follows from the optimization.
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6.4.1. Domestic capital scarcity, foreign capital abundance. We start
with the program (2.11). First we observe that the program is linear
in I and hence participation constraints of the investors have to bind
in order to obtain an interior solution. Thus we can consolidate the
second and the third equation to
αI
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ
+(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
(pH (R− αRH (ρ)− (1− α)RF (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ = I −A
Solving for A and inserting into the objective function yields the famil-
iar expression
max
ρ
I
Ã
ρ1F (ρ)−
Z ρF
0
ρf (ρ) dρ− 1
!
and thus ρF = ρ.
6.4.2. Domestic and foreign capital scarcity. Under this section we
derive the form of the participation constraints (2.20) and (2.21). We
start out with stating the second equation of program (??) as an ex-
ample: µ
IH +
IH
IF + IH
A
¶Z ρH
0
pH
B
∆p
f (ρ) dρ =
µ
IH
IF + IH
¶
A.
This is equivalent toµ
IH (I −A)
I −A +
IH
I −AA
¶
pH
B
∆p
F
¡
ρH
¢
dρ =
µ
IH
IF + IH
¶
A.
Simplifying and solving for F
¡
ρH
¢
then yields F
¡
ρH
¢
= 1I
A
B
∆p
pH
.
6.5. The equivalence of joint-venture and pure-origin fi-
nance. In section (3.2.1) we state the problem for the entrepreneur
under the assumption that each project is in part financed by domestic
investors and receives also a share from foreign investors. Alternatively
the economy could also consist of a share of projects α that is financed
entirely by home investors, leaving a share of projects (1− α) that is
financed by foreign investors. This then gives rise to two programs to
be solved:
max
RH(ρ),λ(ρ),IH
αI
Z ∞
0
pHRH (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− αA
s.t.
αI
Z ∞
0
(pH (R−RH (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ IH
RH (ρ) pH ≥ B +RH (ρ) pL ∀ρ
IH ≤ IH
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and
max
RF (ρ),λ(ρ),IF
(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
pHRF (ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ− (1− α)A
s.t.
(1− α) I
Z ∞
0
(pH (R−RH (ρ))− ρ)λ (ρ) f (ρ) dρ ≥ IF
RF (ρ) pH ≥ BF +RF (ρ) pL ∀ρ.
Clearly, the two programs can be merged into one by simply adding
the objective functions. This yields (2.11).

Part 2
Empirical Inquiries

CHAPTER 3
Accounting for Flows
We oﬀer a survey on the existing sources for both gross
and net flow data on international capital flows. Further,
we set out to oﬀer some measures of the development of
goods market integration relative to financial market in-
tegration. Using data for the last decade, we find that
although gross financial flows were increasing relative to
trade flows, net financial flows were not. Hence, we make
the claim that goods market integration actually has had
roughly the same speed as international financial inte-
gration in the last decade. Increasing gross flows point
towards lower transaction costs and hence increased eﬃ-
ciency in the global financial markets. In this sense, the
integration of the world has indeed deepened.
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1. Introduction
1The following chapter draws a picture of the amount of interna-
tional financial and trade flows and develops a common framework for
the diﬀerent sources of data we have on these flows. There are at least
three good reasons to do that.
First, in the debate on globalization, much attention is given to the
amounts of trade and capital flows, or better their development over the
second half of the last century and, of course, their likely future. The
huge increase in these flows is a defining element of the phenomenon
globalization (Obstfeld and Taylor (2002)). There are voices that say
that there are too many international financial transactions, relative to
real activity, and others that claim that the increased volatility of the
real economy is largely caused by the huge increase in the volume of
international financial flows. Related and quite lively issues in current
economic research are, for example, the quest for the associated welfare
gain by opening the capital account (see for a recent example Gourin-
chas and Jeanne (2003)) or the potential harm excessive volatility of
short term capital flows is inflicting on emerging economies (examples
being Edwards (2001) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999)).
Second, closely related to the first point, there is the discussion
around the Tobin Tax proposal (see Frankel (1996)). Ever since the
introduction of the idea to tax turnover in the international capital
markets there has been a lively debate within the profession over the
potential merits and dangers of such a tax.2
Third, exchange rate economics seem to have come to a dead end3.
At the latest since Meese and Rogoﬀ’s influential paper (Meese and
Rogoﬀ (1983)) the profession has struggled with the phantom of the
unbeatable random walk or, to put it another way, it seems very hard
to impossible to come up with a reasonable model for the exchange
rate that performs well out of sample. A recent follow-up assessment
on the topic provide Cheung, Chinn and Pascual (2004). Assessing
the magnitudes of real and financial flows and comparing both to each
1I wish to thank seminar participants at University of Dresden, Ente "Luigi
Einaudi" Rome and Humboldt University Berlin for discussion and helpful com-
ments. Most of the work was done while I enjoyed the hospitality of the University
of Toulouse 1.
2Recently there has been new research into that field under another headline.
Certain implementations of capital controls work in eﬀect exactly as a Tobin Tax
and have only limited success. This, however, proofs only that an unilateral Tobin
Tax may be not as eﬀective as a global one. See Caballero (2003) and Edwards
(2001) for discussion.
3Recent resurrection eﬀorts, however, are quite promising, see Hau and Rey
(2003) and indicate the incorporation of capital flows into models of exchange rate
determination. Further, to the extent that exchange rate models rely on PPP
there seems to be another interesting development with respect to the PPP failure
discussion. See Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn and Rey (2005).
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other may help to understand the importance of the international par-
ity conditions on which exchange rate economics so heavily is reliant.
Recent attempts to incorporate the idea that capital flows may play a
vital role in exchange rate determination are Hau and Rey (2003) and
Brook, Edison, Kumar and Slok (2001).
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section introduces the
terminology and discusses the various sources of data on international
flows, real and financial. The next section is devoted to describe the
standard data, i.e. balance of payments, where we have to distinguish
between national and supranational reporting. The third part of this
chapter describes the data from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) and its triennial survey on the foreign exchange market. It will
turn out that in the same way the balance of payments (gross flow
reporting) is a lower boundary measure of international capital flows
the foreign exchange markets survey of the BIS is an upper one. We will
explore this relationship in more detail in the fourth section. Further,
we will present estimates of the ratio of real to financial transactions,
based on diﬀerent sources. The final section concludes the chapter.
2. General remarks
In this section we will give an overview over the existing sources
of data on international capital flows (ICF) as well as discuss termi-
nology. We begin with a discussion of the national sources of data on
ICFs. As specific examples we will use the cases of Germany and the
United States. These sources will mainly be related to the balance
of payments (BoP) of the country, a statistic that is normally com-
piled and supplied by the national central bank. Subsequently, we turn
to supra-nationally provided data. The two sources that are publicly
available (and widely used in practice) are the International Monetary
Fund International Financial Statistics (IMF-IFS) and the World Bank
Global Development Finance (GDF). Lastly, we give an overview over
the BIS triennial survey on foreign exchange market activity.
Data on real (gross) flows are not diﬃcult to come by and are
readily available using either supra-national sources, as for instance
the World Bank or the IMF, or national sources as the central banks
or governmental statistical oﬃces that provide data on the current
account. Moreover, as much discussion there is with respect to ICFs,
real flows (and the measurement of it) are a strikingly undisputed issue.
In what follows, we therefore restrict our attention to the diﬀerent
sources of capital flows and introduce - in passing - the definition of
real flows we will use throughout the chapter.
2.1. Definitions. International capital flows in the sense we use
for our analysis are monetary flows from one country to another that
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result into changes of ownership of physical capital, financial capital or
derivative assets.
This is the also definition that is used by virtually all data compil-
ing agencies. When using this definition, it is important to be aware of
the diﬀerence between capital flows that occur between two countries
that have the same unit of account and countries that have diﬀerent
currencies. Which concept should be used depends on both the ques-
tion under consideration and data availability. Since, in theory, the
denomination of the original capital flow does not matter4, one should,
from a theoretical point of view, prefer the broadest possible measure
of ICFs including such that occur inside a currency union. Whereas
this seems feasible for the Euro area, it is not straightforward to obtain
such data for the United States. Additionally, most negative eﬀects
of capital flows are attributed to their influence on nominal exchanges
rates. As currency unions are a device to credibly fix nominal exchange
rates between member countries these negative eﬀects can no longer oc-
cur. The member countries have the same nominal interest rates and
it remains only a real exchange rate that separates them.
ICFs are usually categorized into foreign direct investment (FDI),
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and other foreign investment (OFI)
including bank loans and corporate debt. We will make use of the
definitions of the IMF BoP manual (see IMF (1993)).
In contrast to the ICFs stand what we call real flows (RF). Follow-
ing the standard definition, every transaction between two entities of
diﬀerent nationality involving the exchange of goods and services will
constitute a real flow5. It is clear that, following this definition, for
every real transaction, there will be at least one financial transaction.
Further, for the sake of consistency and following the lines of the ar-
gument made above, we have to distinguish between real transaction
within a currency union and such that involve at least two currencies.6
In what follows, we will only focus on RFs that involve two diﬀerent
currencies, however, in order to facilitate comparison in some instances
we will also report those that occurred within a currency union, namely
within the EMU.
2.2. National sources. Under this section we will explore the
sources for ICF data we have on the national level. In principle we
could use, grace to increased data availability, data from almost all
countries of the world. We will, however, confine our attention to
data from Germany and the United States. The case of Germany
4For example in the context of a neoclassical growth model.
5Hence barter transactions are not included in our definition.
6There are a couple of reason why a real transaction could provoke more than
one currency transaction. The easiest example would be a flow of goods from
country A to country B whereas the exchange of monies would use a vehicle currency
C.
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may be considered as the benchmark for the typical OECD country,
whereas the United States deserve special attention for a variety of
other reasons. To our knowledge, it is only in the U.S. that data on
ICFs can be obtained independently from the BoP accounts and in a
more detailed manner. The Treasury International Capital (TIC) data
contains monthly gross purchases of long term capital of U.S. entities
from foreigners and, vice versa, sales of U.S. assets to foreigners. Long
term securities following the definition of the U.S. treasury department
are "equities and debt issues with an original maturity of more than
one year .. issued by U.S. or foreign-based firms"7.Hence, using the TIC
data, we are able to obtain an estimate for gross portfolio investment
into and out of the most important economy of the world.
At the national level, e.g. for Germany, we will use publicly avail-
able BoP figures. The BoP is the systematic account of all transac-
tions of the inhabitants of one country with the rest of the world. It
is normally compiled by the central bank or monetary authority of the
country. The quality and availability of the data greatly diﬀers be-
tween developing and developed countries, yet recently the IMF has
tried to promote international standards (see IMF (1993)) to which
a growing number of states comply. It is thus natural to employ the
capital account of the balance of payments to assess the volume of in-
ternational financial flows. This attempt, however, is hampered for two
reasons. The first is that the capital account only reports diﬀerences
in the stocks of the assets. We can, of course, overcome this first prob-
lem, by simply diﬀerencing stocks to obtain flow data.8 The second
impediment is actually more severe. The capital account of the BoP
only reports net flows that occurred in the period under consideration.
That means that, ceteris paribus, the length of the period determines
the degree to which the amount of net flows is an accurate estimator
for the amount of gross flows in that period. Ideally we would like to
have access to data that covers each transaction and thus gross flow
data. Instead we only have, for example, diﬀerences in foreign holdings
of long term bonds between, at best, the beginning and the end of a
month. This would mean, to continue our example that a transaction,
involving the purchase and resale of a certain amount of long term
bonds within the period would not be reported in the BoP. Also, more
generally, capital brought into the country for shorter maturities than
the reporting period will not show up in our data. To that extent the
BoP statistic systematically underestimates international capital flows.
Henceforth we will call this underestimation "aggregation bias", for a
main source of error is the aggregation within the reporting interval.
7See http://www.treas.gov for the description of the data.
8This, however, would only be suﬃcient in a world without depreciation and
other valuation eﬀects.
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A special case, again, is the US TIC data. Even though this data
provides access to gross flows, it suﬀers heavily frommeasurement prob-
lems.9 The existence of survey data to scrutinize the accuracy of the
TIC (see Warnock and Cleaver (2003)), however, distinguishes in our
view this data from the usual available national sources. We will thus
use this source to gain further insights into the size of the aggregation
bias.
2.3. Supranational sources. There are several institutions in
the world that collect and distribute data on ICFs, the most prominent
being the IMF and the World Bank. Naturally, most of these institu-
tions simply present data provided by national central banks in another
way. Thus, theoretically, this data should be the same as the data that
can be obtained from national sources alone. The crucial diﬀerence,
however, is the way the data are aggregated and sorted, mostly in a
fashion to facilitate comparison or induce consistency (or both) (see
IMF (2001)).
In the case of the IMF BoP data the price for consistency seems
quite high - where in the majority of cases monthly data is available
the IMF reports only with annual frequency. The aforementioned ag-
gregation bias thus may be even more severe with the IMF data. In
principle then, we have the alternative of using the IMF annual data -
which reports capital flows directly - for a comprehensive set of coun-
tries or, for the sake of accuracy, compile a list of countries that report
capital account changes monthly and then take each of these countries
BoP data to infer the monthly amount of capital flows. Interestingly
enough, doing both and compare the results with the data we have
from the IMF should enable us to assess the extent of the aggregation
bias when switching from monthly to annual reporting. Although do-
ing that for all countries is beyond the scope of our work, this will be
our methodology for the two selected cases of Germany and the US.
Another source that deals, indirectly, with the issue of ICFs is the
World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF) that is published an-
nually. The GDF data contains flow and stock data. The main focus
of the dataset are less developed countries. Because of this focus most
of the flows reported are debt related. In terms of aggregation bias the
quality of this data is roughly comparable with the IFS data, for the
reporting is annually. In what follows we will not make use of this data
set, mainly for reasons of consistency.
There is a sizeable literature that makes use of capital flow data
for several purposes.10 Some researchers use publicly available sources
9Apart from that it only covers FPI.
10Examples are the influence of capital account liberalization on welfare Gour-
inchas and Jeanne (2003), the influence of structure of capital flows on growth
Mody and Murshid (2002) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
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for their work, others have the benefit of having access to confidential
data (see Warnock and Cleaver (2003)) and others still make use of
data that is very hard to come by or grossly expensive (one example
being Rodrik and Velasco (1999)). One of this sources is the data
set on ICFs of the Institute of International Finance (IIF) that has a
special focus on short term capital flows. This source appears to be
quite comprehensive in scope and thus better suitable as the IMF and
World Bank data taken together (see Rodrik and Velasco (1999, p.12)).
We were, however, not able to obtain this data and will thus proceed
without incorporating its implication into our analysis.
2.4. BIS data. Although the Bank for International Settlement is
a supranational organization in the sense introduced above, the char-
acter of the data warrants its treatment in a separate section. The
evidence from the triennial exchange rate market survey (see Bank
BIS (2002)), conducted under the guidance of the BIS by the central
banks of 5211 participating countries is in some sense the opposite to
the BoP data we discussed in the previous sections. The BIS data re-
ports the complete12 foreign exchange turnover for one selected day of
a given month. Since international capital flows must, by definition,
go through the foreign exchange market, the data will account for all
international capital flows at this date.13 Unfortunately, it will also
cover other activities than movements of capital. A considerable pro-
portion will be intra dealer transactions and thus not falling under our
definition of capital flows. Another source of error is that capital flows
often are intermediated through financial centers and thus there may
be two flows reported where in reality is only one. The above should
make clear that the figures of the foreign exchange market survey sys-
tematically overestimates the amount of international capital flows.
Problematic may also prove the aggregation we have to undertake in
order to compare the daily data with our usual monthly aggregates.
By aggregating the flows of one day we have to implicitly assume that
all the other days were just the same. This seems to be the compromise
we have to make when using this data and we have to be aware that
this assumption will lead us astray in case of such extreme events as
an international financial crises.
11This is the latest figure for the 2004 survey. The first survey was conducted
in 1986 with only 15 countries participating.
12Complete here refers to the best we can get. There are qualifications that
have to be made. First, not all countries decided to participate in the survey.
Second, not all market participants in the countries that decided to take part did
respond. Even so, the BIS survey claims to cover roughly 95% of foreign exchange
market turnover.
13With the possible exception of equity swaps that are increasingly popular to
pay for merger and acquisition activities. An estimation of the relative importance
of such transactions is presented by Warnock (2002).
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3. The evidence from national sources
3.1. Evidence from the US - capital flows.
3.1.1. BoP data. In the case of the US there is, to our knowledge,
no gross flow data on BoP level. Instead the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), the body that is in charge of providing the BoP figures,
reports quarterly net flows. Thus we report our estimates of monthly
net capital flows in and out of the US in this section as these are derived
from the BoP issuing body, namely the BEA:
BoP
figures for the US
Domestic Net Foreign Net
Capital Outflow Capital Inflow
April 1992 9 18
April 1995 40 41
April 1998 47 66
April 2001 32 91
April 2004 37 91
Table 1: US Net Capital Flows 1992 - 2004 (Billions of US-Dollars)14
Since in the case of the US-BoP we had only access to quarterly
data, we divided the reported amounts for the second quarter of the
year in question by 3. Note that for 1992 there were no direct invest-
ment figures available.
The above figures show that the US is a net borrower in the in-
ternational capital markets. This is true for all periods we have data
on. At the same time, the amount of international diversification was
increasing. This can be seen from the rising net capital flows into and
out of the US.
3.1.2. TIC data. The US Treasury department has its own data-
base for international financial transaction. Originally the reason to
start the collection of this data has been to monitor the development
of foreign ownership of US assets, thus political considerations were at
play here. A decade or so later the reporting was extended to cater also
for US holdings of foreign assets. Data collection is done on a regular
basis and quality is controlled for by survey studies. From the BEA we
can obtain gross direct investment data to complete the picture.
14We obtained the data from the website of the BEA -
http://www.bea.gov/bea/international/bp_web/simple.cfm.
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TIC and BEA
figures for the US
Gross Capital Gross Capital Daily
Outflow Inflow Turnover
April 1992 242 249 23,4
April 1995 304 312 29,3
April 1998 781 792 74,9
April 2001 1026 1064 99,6
April 2004 1570 1655 154
Table 2: USGross Capital Flows 1992-2004 (Billions of US-Dollars)15
Our estimation of the capital outflow in the period under consid-
eration was obtained by using the TIC long term asset gross figures
for purchases of US residents from foreign entities plus the amount of
US direct investment abroad. Since in this case we had only access to
quarterly data, we divided the reported amounts for the second quarter
of the year in question by 3. Note that for 1992 there were no direct
investment figures available. Implied turnover is calculated as the sum
of capital outflows and inflows divided by 21, which is the amount of
working days in April. Implicit in that procedure is the notion that
transactions are not netted out against each other. Instead each and
every transaction adds to turnover.
The US figures are remarkable in some ways. First they reflect the
commonly known fact that the US enjoys the benefits of sustained net
capital inflows, or two put it diﬀerently, is allowed to run sustained
current account deficits. This is true for all the diﬀerent investment
categories we have detailed data on and over the entire horizon under
consideration. Secondly, from both gross and net flow figures, we can
see a pronounced rise in capital movements. This might be interpreted
as what is commonly referred to as financial globalization, i.e. the
increasing integration of the world capital markets. Some words of
caution, however, may be in order here. The increase appears less
startling, if we account for both inflation and growth. Whereas this
argument may be valid for the increase between April 1992 and April
1995 .- around 25% - it is less problematic if we look at the increase
between April 1995 and April 2004 for all quarters. All in all, gross
capital flows - as measured by our estimates - grew more than fourfold
between 1992 and 2001. It thus seems safe to say that on basis of this
15Data are taken from http://www.treas.gov/tic/s1_99996.txt. In the case of
the US we have had only access to gross long term securities transactions and gross
direct investment figures. Direct investment was on quarterly basis, gross long term
TIC data on monthly basis.
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evidence we can assert that financial globalization of the US indeed
deepened, at least from 1995 onwards.
3.2. Evidence from the US - trade flows. The BEA provides
BoP data for the US. From the website of this institution we were able
to obtain the gross trade figures for the US. These figures are shown
below:
Real Flows
US
Import Exports Daily Turnover
April 1992 53 50 4,9
April 1995 75 65 6,7
April 1998 91 78 8,0
April 2001 118 87 9,8
April 2004 143 94 11,3
Table 3: US Real Flows 1992-2004 (Billions of US-Dollars)
Table 3 shows a steady increase in trade levels (goods and services)
between April 1992 and April 2004, which is, however, less pronounced
than the increase in financial flows during the same period. Neverthe-
less, the growth in trade levels outstrips real GDP growth so that we
can, in the light of the above figures, assert that trade integration of
the US economy in terms of real flows has increased during the 1990s.
3.3. The case of Germany - capital flows. The Bundesbank
collects figures and compiles the balance of payments since 1956. In
1995 the reporting standard was changed to accommodate for the sug-
gestions made by the IMF, i.e. the latest edition of the IMF Balance
of Payments Handbook. The monthly publication contains capital ac-
count data with fine breakdowns after countries, sectors and instru-
ments. As is standard, the Zahlungsbilanzstatistik contains net flows
in and out of the country. In the case of Germany, however, there are
also gross figures of flows, at least for the three asset classes direct in-
vestment, portfolio investment and other investment. The figures are
stemming from fortnightly collected reports that German banks are
obliged to send to the Bundesbank. These reports should in theory
contain every transaction above a certain threshold level, this at the
moment being 12500 Euro (see Kruse (2000, pp.1-3)). We report, both
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net and gross flow figures below:
BoP figures
for Germany
Domestic Net Foreign Net
Capital Outflow Capital Inflow
April 1992 6,0 10
April 1995 11 14
April 1998 27 28
April 2001
with EMU 22 20
April 2001
without EMU 15 9
April 2004
with EMU 30 -5
Table 4: Germany: Net Capital Flows 1992-2004
BoP Figures
for Germany
Gross Capital Gross Capital Daily
Outflows Inflows Turnover
April 1992 84 53 6,6
April 1995 182 183 17,4
April 1998 291 287 27,5
April 2001
with EMU 384 363 35,5
April 2001
without EMU 263 270 25,4
April 2004
with EMU 682 668 64,3
April 2004
without EMU 487 454 44,8
Table 5: Germany: Gross Capital Flows 1992-2004
Table 4 and 5 report figures in billions of US-Dollars. If original
figures referred to Euro or GermanMark we converted this using the av-
erage US-Dollar/Euro Rate for the period under consideration: 1.1985
for April 2004, 0.89290 for April 2001, 0.551 (US-Dollar/DM) for April
1998, 0.72483 for April 1995 (Source: www.oanda.com).
Capital outflows, as presented here, are the summation of new di-
rect investment abroad, domestic purchases of foreign held financial
assets, liquidation of stock of foreign direct investment and foreign
sales of domestic financial assets. All the figures were taken from the
Bundesbank (2005). In the years 1998 and 1995 only aggregated data
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was available, so an estimate of the monthly figures was obtained by di-
viding by 12. Capital inflows, as presented here, are the summation of
new foreign direct investment, sales of domestic financial assets to for-
eigners, liquidation of stock of domestic direct investment abroad and
purchases of foreigners of domestic financial assets. All figures were
taken from Bundesbank (2005). In the years 1998 and 1995 only ag-
gregated data was available, so an estimate of the monthly figures was
obtained by dividing by 12. Implied daily turnover is calculated as the
sum of capital outflows and inflows divided by 21, which is the amount
of working days in April. Implicit in that procedure is the notion that
transactions are not netted out against each other but instead each
and every transaction adds to turnover. These figures were estimated
using the overall estimated amount for April 2001 ICFs including EMU
countries subtracting the share EMU countries had in this year in net
capital exports or imports. The respective shares we used were 28,55%
and 31,15%. This asymmetry explains the reversal of the qualitative
result.
The German gross figures confirm the global trend of a rise of inter-
national financial integration during the last decade. The increase of
capital movements in and out of Germany between 1995 and 2004 was
steady and pronounced. Our estimates for the gross monthly capital
flows imply a daily turnover at the foreign exchange market which is
reported in the last column of table 5. In fact, this will be our vehi-
cle to compare the BoP gross flow data with the BIS foreign exchange
turnover data. In doing this calculation we cannot, however, attribute
this flows to a certain instrument.
The ICFs in and out of Germany grew more than 8-fold in the last
decade if intra EMU capital flows are taken into account. In the Dollar
figures used above, this is slightly more than the increase in the US. We
finally turn to compare the degree of international financial integration
of Germany and the US, using the capital movements per GDP ratio
for the two countries:
Financial Openness: Gross Capital Movements
per GDP
Germany US
April 1995 0,6 0,1
April 1998 1,1 0,2
April 2001 1,7/1,2 0,2
April 2004 3,2/2,2 0,8
Table 6: Financial Openness Indicator: US and Germany
Capital movements as used in Table 6 are all capital inflows plus all
capital outflows of the period under consideration. GDP figure were
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obtained from IMF IFS. For the years 2001 and 2004 the first ratio
includes intra EMU ICFs, the ratio does not.
Clearly, although the changing Dollar (strong until 2002, then weaker)
exerts some influence on this figures, according to this simple calcula-
tion Germany started from a much more open position. In general,
the German economy is perceived to be more integrated into the world
markets than is the US. Lately, however, the US integration into world
financial markets has been increasing with higher speed.
3.4. The case of Germany - trade flows. As noted earlier there
is no great diﬃculty obtaining the amount of gross real flows. We report
the real flows in and out of Germany following the Bundesbank figures
(see for example Bundesbank (2005)):
Real Flows
Germany
Imports Exports Daily Flows
April 1992 46 45 4,3
April 1995 60 59 5,7
April 1998 58 56 5,4
April 2001 with EMU 64 62 6,0
April 2001 without EMU 37 37 3,5
April 2004 with EMU 83 95 8,5
April 2004 without EMU 36 41 3,7
Table 7: Germany: Real flows 1992 - 2004 (Billions of US-Dollars)
Imports (exports) in Table 7 are imports (exports) of goods and
services, including income payments. Original figures referred to ei-
ther DM or Euro. We calculated US-Dollar values using average ex-
change rates for the period under consideration, specifically: April
1995: 0,72483 USD/DEM, April 1998 0,551 USD/DEM, April 2001
0,8929 USD/EUR, April 2004, 1,1985 USD/EUR (Source: www.oanda.com).
Figures are to monthly averages, since we had only access to annual
data. In the case of the year 2001, monthly figures were available, yet
in order to allow for the exclusion of intra EMU trade we had, once
again, resort to annual figures. Breakdown for EMU counterparties is
only available for trade in goods. Therefore, services and transfers have
been attributed using the trade in goods share.
It may seem surprising that levels of trade have decreased between
1995 and 1998 (and roughly remained constant between 1995 and 2001).
The main reason for this, however, is that we report the figures in US-
Dollar. Between 1995 and 2001 there has been a steady devaluation of
the Deutsche Mark (later Euro) against the US-Dollar. To distinguish
between real flows that stipulate the exchange of currencies and such
that do not, we report RF’s with and without intra EMU flows. As can
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be seen from the table, intra EMU trade in 2001 accounted for roughly
50% of the overall trade. This share decreased slightly in 2004.
4. The evidence from supranational sources
4.1. The evidence from the IMF-IFS. Since its birth one clear
goal of the IMF has always been to promote an internationally consis-
tent system of accounting. To this end, the IMF sets international
standards for the compilation of the BoP that are widely adapted.
The publication of the 5th edition of the BoP manual in 1993 by the
IMF marks the most recent eﬀort (IMF (1993)). Since then, most of
the member states have adopted this set of rules and report BoP data
accordingly to the IMF. The result is what the IMF publishes regu-
larly under the heading International Financial Statistic. In order to
estimate the amount of ICFs from the IFS we use the aggregate out-
flows presented under the section balance of payments, especially posi-
tions Direct Investment Abroad (78bdd), Portfolio Investment Assets
(78bfd), Other Investment Assets (78bhd) and Reserve Assets (79dbd).
We excluded Financial Derivatives Assets (78bwd) since the reporting
is not consistent (see IMF (2001, p.xxiii)) and data are sparse. Further,
we focus here on outflows, since an outflow in country A constitutes
an inflow in country B. Therefore we prevent double counting by only
using either outflows or inflows.
The data in the IFS will show a negative sign if in the period under
consideration the asset position of the country increased (outflow) and
a positive sign if the asset position decreased (capital moving back into
the economy). For the purposes of calculating the amount of ICFs,
however, we will treat capital that is moving back into the economy as
an outflow and hence negate the sign of the transaction. In contrast to
the numbers reported for the International Investment Position (IIP),
depreciation is not accounted for by calculating the BoP figures. In
general, the BoP figures only relate to flows that occurred, leaving
aside valuation issues of existing stocks (see IMF (1993, p.77)).(There
is now an influential literature that picks up exactly this point, see for
example Gourinchas and Rey (2005)).
The amount of net capital flows reported in the BoP is underesti-
mating the actual net flows in that reporting is limited in some cases to
annual data (see IMF (1993, p.80)). Transactions concerning the same
class of assets within the reporting period will be aggregated and thus
may net out each other (see IMF (1993, p.80)) Hence, ceteris paribus,
the greater the reporting interval, the greater will be what we call ag-
gregation bias. On the national level, we have access to monthly BoP
data, yet consolidated IFS data is only available at annual frequency,
thus, most likely, rendering the aggregation bias worse. We report our
estimates in the table below:
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Net ICFs IMF-IFS
figures
Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Capital outflows 1200 1625 2144 2568 n.a.
Table 8: World Capital Outflows 1992-2001 (Billions of US-Dollars)
Following the IMF-IFS data, net flows of capital between countries
increased between 1992 and 2001.This result appears to be somewhat
in contrast to the findings of the BIS survey, which reported a marked
decline of exchange market activity in 2001. However, by plotting the
evolution of the ICFs over the whole period we see that capital flows
peaked twice in the sample, 1997 and 2000 at both dates being in value
higher than the 2001 figure. The diagram below makes this point more
clear:
International Capital Flows 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Years
Va
lu
e 
in
 B
ill
io
n 
US
-D
ol
la
rs
 
Figure 1. World Capital Outflows 1992-2002
5. The evidence from the foreign exchange market
One way to define international financial flows is to postulate that
international financial flows are flows of liquid assets from one currency
area to another. This definition surely fails to accommodate for capital
flows between, at present for instance, France and Germany. It is,
however, the relevant one when the focus is on exchange rate behavior,
for capital flows between France and Germany only have an influence
on the real exchange rate between the two countries, as the nominal
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no longer exists. Sticking with this definition, it is natural to look
at the foreign exchange market in order to assess the magnitude of
international capital flows falling into the framework given above.
5.1. The triennial survey of the Bank for International Set-
tlements. The perhaps most comprehensive, publicly available source
that documents the developments in the foreign exchange market is the
"Triennial Central Bank Survey" which is conducted under the aegide
of the BIS in Basle. As the name suggests this is a survey study which
once in every three years monitors the foreign exchange market for the
period of one day. The first survey has been carried out in 1989, the
most recent one in 2004. The month under investigation has always
been the April of that year, whereas the day diﬀered from study to
study due to the influence of bank holidays. At country level the cen-
tral banks of the participating nations are responsible for gathering the
data. These data are then send over to Basle, where the final report
is assembled. The number of participants in this survey has increased
steadily from only 21 countries in 1989 to 52 in 2004.
5.2. Main findings of the last BIS-Survey. The global daily
turnover in the foreign exchange market, as measured in April 2004,
was around 1880 billion US Dollars. This constitutes a marked rise
in comparison with the previous survey, where the daily turnover was
found to equal roughly 1380 billion Dollar and also a rise in compar-
ison with the former "record turnover" reported in April 1998. The
following table gives a more detailed view of these results.
Global FX market
turnover
Year 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Spot 317 394 494 568 387 621
Forwards 27 58 97 128 131 208
Swaps 190 324 546 734 656 944
Estimated gaps 56 44 53 60 26 107
Total turnover 650 840 1120 1590 1380 1880
Table 9: Foreign Exchange Market Turnover 1989-2004 (Billions of
US-Dollars)
The breakdown is in the classical instruments of the foreign ex-
change market. Spot transactions are either purchases or sales of for-
eign exchange today for delivery in two days. Outright forwards are
contracts which obligate to purchase or sell a specified amount of for-
eign exchange at a specified date in the future (The demand for forward
contracts in the context of hedging is investigated in chapter one.). For-
eign exchange swaps are purchases or sales of foreign exchange today
for delivery in two days (spot/forward swap) or delivery at farther away
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(forward/forward swap) dates together with the opposite transaction
at a date even more in the future. It is clear from the above that out-
right forwards can also be synthesized by a suitable combination of a
spot transaction and a swap. This is the reason for the distinction
being made between outright forwards and such that are constructed.
Table 9 shows that between 1998 and 2001 global FX turnover
sharply declined and bounced back in 2004. The by far biggest pro-
portion of the secular decline in turnover between 1998 and 2001 oc-
curred in the spot market, followed by the swaps, whereas the volume
of outright forwards increased every period. The main reasons behind
this observed decline may be the introduction of the Euro, a more
widespread use of electronic brooking and the ongoing concentration
processes in the banking industry and the corporate sector (BIS2001,
p. 6). In fact, additional evidence for this proposition is provided by
the national gross figures. According to the US and German figures,
capital flows increased, if not for reasons of the unit of account or the
introduction of the Euro. The decline in 2001 can thus, in part, also
be attributed to the dollar appreciation versus Euro and Yen.
Another interesting aspect of the data is the breakdown of the for-
eign exchange market activity after type of counterparty. The share
of intradealer trading between 1992 and 2004 declined substantially by
20%, the likely causes being the ongoing consolidation of the industry
and the introduction of electronic brooking systems. In contrast, the
amount traded between banks rose by 20% in the same time. The rela-
tive share of the turnover with non-financial customers stayed constant,
with a peak in 1998. In the last two rows, table 10 contains a geograph-
ical breakdown. Following this, the relative importance of cross-border
FX transactions has steadily risen. The findings are summarized below.
FX turnover
by counterparty
Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
with reporting dealers 73 64 64 59 53
with other financial institutions 13 20 20 28 33
with non-financial customers 14 16 17 13 14
local n.a. 46 46 43 38
cross-border n.a. 54 54 57 62
Table10: Foreign Exchange Market Turnover, Breakdown Af-
ter Counterparties (Percentage of global turnover)
There is a simple way to estimate the amount of ICFs from the BIS
FX survey data. If we only focus on ICFs that involve capital crossing
currency borders, we know that the estimate we are looking for is a
subset of the total amount of foreign exchange market turnover. Fur-
ther we should deduct the amount that was traded between traders.
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This implicitly assumes that capital movements from one destination
to another just involve one dealer. This assumption may be justified on
grounds of eﬃciency reasoning and the existence of active intradealer
trading to overcome information problems (Galati (2001, p. 4)). Fur-
ther we should also deduct the amount of RFs from this data, since
for every RF in the sense we use it here, there should be at least one
FX transaction. As mentioned above, this figure would still be an
overestimation of actual ICFs but will serve us well as a benchmark.
ICF benchmark -
BIS figures
1992 1995 1998 1998* 2001 2004
FX without intra dealer 227 302 572 572 566 884
RF of that year 4701,4 6350,6 6833,7 6833,7 7640,4 9298,0
RF adjusted for
intra euro area trade 4701,4 6350,6 6833,7 6023,4 6677,9 7585,5
RF daily 18,8 25,4 27,3 24,1 26,7 30,3
Benchmark 208,2 276,6 375,7 547,9 625,3 853,7
Ratio 1:11 1:11 1:20 1:23 1:20 1:28
Table 11: ICF Benchmark (Billions of US-Dollars)
Real flow figures refer to world total of exports of merchandise goods
of that year plus world total of services exports of that year and are
taken from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Statistic. In-
tra Euro Area data is taken from Eurostat and converted by the average
USD/EUR exchange rate of April of that year. Note that for 1998 the
exchange rate is based on a synthetic Euro. We divided the annual
figure by 250, which is approximately the annual number of working
days to get daily figures.
For the years 1992 and 1995 the global aggregate reported by the
WTO is not problematic. After that date the introduction of the Euro
had already aﬀected the traded volume in the FXmarket (Galati (2001,
p. 5)). Since the Euro has come into eﬀect at the 01.01.1999 we are
faced with an ambiguity regarding the year 1998. The convergence to
the announced rates may have aﬀected the amount of FX trades well
before the 01.01.1999 and hence our sample of 1998 may be biased
downwards. For this reason we report two benchmark values for 1998.
One with and one without the amount of trade within the Euro area.
The case is clear again in 2001, where we deducted the amount of
intra Euro area trade. In order to render the annual trade volume
comparable to the foreign exchange data, we divided the amount by
the number of business days of the year under consideration.
Following our results the ratio of real to financial transactions has
increased from 1992 with roughly constant speed and then in 2001
fallen to 1995 levels. The increase is certainly due to a global trend of
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increasing financial integration, something that is also often referred to
as financial globalization (see for a discussion Eichengreen and Bordo
(2002)).
5.3. Results for the US. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
conducts the US-part of the BIS survey. The breakdown is more de-
tailed than in the aggregate study that is provided by the BIS, however,
the figures do not contain an estimation of the amount of foreign ex-
change transactions that were intradealer trades. The US were among
the first to join the initiative of the BIS to conduct a FX market survey
every three years. Even though the available estimates reach back until
1986, we do not report them here since in most of our other cases we
only have data from 1992 onwards.
US FX market
turnover
Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Spot 95 134 148 104 221
Forward 13 28 37 36 62
Swap 59 83 166 114 178
Total 167 244 351 254 461
Table 12: US: Foreign Exchange Market Turnover after Instru-
ments16
What can be seen from table 12 is the steady rise in exchange
market activity until its first peak in 1998, the sudden fall in overall
volume in 2001 and the recovery in 2004. It is apparent that in the
case of the US data the intermediate fall in turnover can mainly be
attributed to the decrease in spot and swap trading.
5.4. Results for Germany. The Bundesbank collects the figures
of the triennial survey for Germany. In April 2004 a total of 33 financial
institutions took voluntarily part in the survey. This amounts to some
90% of the whole German foreign exchange market. The global trend
of a declining volume of spot transactions in 2001 was also visible in the
German data. The interbank dealing fell substantially between 1998
and 2001. The data are shown in the table below:
German FX market turnover
Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Spot 30 34 42 26 36
Forward 3 4 8 12 n.a.
Swap 22 38 44 51 82∗
Total 55 77 94 88 118
16Billions of current Dollars.
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Table 13: Germany: Foreign Exchange Market Turnover after In-
struments (Billions of US-Dollars)
6. Trade versus financial flows
We are now in the position to present four diﬀerent estimators for
the ratio of real to financial transactions. There are two distinct per-
spectives for the estimators of this ratio: on the world level and on the
country level. For each perspective we calculated several ratios. At the
world level, the first ratio will be based on the comparison between the
amount of ICFs implied by the BIS financial flow data and the RFs
reported by WTO trade figures. Naturally, as the above discussion
made clear, this will constitute an upper bound for our ratio. Corre-
spondingly, the lower bound measure for the ratio of real to financial
flows is based on a comparison between the (net) ICFs reported in the
IMF IFS database and the aforementioned WTO trade figures. Our
estimates are reported in the table below:
ICF-RF ratio
World Level
BISICF
WorldGrossRF .
IMF-IFSNetICF
WorldGrossRF .
April 1992 11:1 1:4
April 1995 11:1 1:4
April 1998 23:1 1:3
April 2001 23:1 1:3
April 2004 28:1 n.a.
Table 14: International Financial Integration vs. Goods Market
Integration
The picture that emerges is interesting. Based on our upper bound
measure, for every dollar worth of real flows, we had something in be-
tween 11 and 28 dollar worth gross capital flows. The ratio increased
sharply between 1995 and 2004, implying that the foreign exchange
turnover was growing at a higher rate than international trade turnover.
If we were to accept this turnover data as a measure of international
financial integration, we could assert that international financial in-
tegration was growing stronger than goods market integration during
the period 1992-2004. However, our second measure is pointing to a
diﬀerent interpretation. The ratio of net financial flows to real flows is
first constant and then increasing slightly, implying that goods market
integration has indeed been growing with roughly comparable speed to
financial market integration. For 2004 we could not calculate the ratio
due to missing IMF-IFS figures.
At this point it is important to note the diﬀerent economic content
of these two estimators. Both are measures of financial integration
relative to goods market integration. The first one could be, broadly,
interpreted as a measure of financial market eﬃciency, whereas the
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second one provides a measure for international risk sharing. Behind
this lies the reasoning that gross ICFs reflect mainly short term capital
movements and hence measure arbitrage, whereas net ICFs, as provided
by the IMF-IFS database, reflect structural changes in portfolios.
In this context it is important to remember the fact that net finan-
cial flows and net trade flows are connected via an accounting identity.
This is the reason why comparing the two would be a pointless exercise.
We believe, however, that caculating ratios of gross flows or comparing
gross trade flows with net financial flows does convey economic content
in the sense discussed above.
The second measure we provide is a country specific estimator based
on the ICF estimators derived from the BoP data we obtained from the
US and Germany, in both cases relative to the gross trade figures of
these two countries versus the rest of the world. At the country level we
have two measures of gross ICFs, the country specific BIS FX turnover
data and the gross ICFs obtained from TCI (US) and BoP (Germany).
ICF_RF ratio
Country Level - US
US (BIS) ICF
US RF (Gross)
US (TCI) ICF
US RF (Gross)
April 1992 8:1 5:1
April 1995 12:1 4:1
April 1998 15:1 9:1
April 2001 10:1 10:1
April 2004 18:1 14:1
US (BoP) ICF
US RF (Net)
April 1992 1:4
April 1995 1:2
April 1998 1:2
April 2001 1:2
April 2004 1:2
Table 15: US: International Financial Integration versus Goods
Market Integration17
The picture that emerges is similar to the one we have at the world
level. First, the ratio of gross ICFs to gross RFs is very high and in-
creases steadily between 1992 and 1998. After that there is a markedly
decline in that ratio, i.e. it goes down a third. In 2004 the ratio is
again up to a new record level. Again, following this estimate, we
would conclude that in the case of the US, financial market integra-
tion has deepened at higher speed during the 1990s than goods market
17Since in the US data intradealer turnover is not accounted for we calculate
the ex intra dealer FX turnover using the international average and subtract this
amount from the original reported. Additionally the dollar equivalent of the trade
flows is subtracted.
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integration. Using the TCI data to measure ICFs into and out of the
US, however, a diﬀerent picture emerges: financial market activity has
been increasing, notwithstanding the marked drop in 2001, relative to
real activity from 1995 onwards. Lastly, comparing net ICFs with gross
RFs, the case of the US roughly resembles our results for the world.
The ratio of net ICFs to real flows has been slightly increasing between
1992 and 1995 and from then on has been relative constant - which
points towards an interpretation that goods and financial market glob-
alization in the US go with comparable speed.
Our last table in this section report the same type of estimators
for Germany. The comparison between BIS data and gross RFs yields
qualitatively the same results as in the other two cases. It is noteworthy,
however, that Germany constitutes a special case, as it is a member of
the EMU. This in turn is very likely to aﬀect our results. The common
currency was introduced only in 2001, yet financial markets use the
Euro already since 1999. This leads to an ambiguity with respect to the
year 2001 figures. Clearly, FX turnover in Germany will have declined,
since intra EMU FX trade in not necessary anymore. The same should
be true for gross ICFs and, to a lesser extent perhaps, for net ICFs. This
is the reason why we report two figure for 2001, the first comparing the
respective measures of ICFs with overall gross trade flows, the second
comparing it only with extra EMU trade flows.
ICF- RF ratio
Country Level - Germany
German (BIS) ICF
German RF
German (BoP) ICF
German RF (Gross)
April 1992 2:1 2:1
April 1995 4:1 3:1
April 1998 5:1 5:1
April 2001 with EMU 5:1 4:1
April 2001 without EMU 9:1 9:1
April 2004 13:1 12:1
German (BoP) ICF
German RF (Net)
April 1992 1:6
April 1995 1:5
April 1998 1:2
April 2001 with EMU 1:3
April 2001 without EMU 1:3
April 2004 1:2
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Table 16: Germany: International Financial Integration versus Goods
Market Integration18
Again, our results for Germany are broadly in line with the other
two cases. First, BIS ICFs have, compared to trade flows increased
during the sample period, the only exception being the case where we
allow for intra EMU trade to be counted. Note that this seems to
absorb the fall we see in the 2001 ratios worldwide and in the US.
The same holds true for the comparison between BoP gross ICFs and
trade flows, showing the same tendency as the US ratios, again with
the exception of allowing for intra EMU trade to be counted. Lastly,
the ratio of net ICFs to gross RFs in Germany exhibits a hump-shaped
trend, in contrast to what we observe in the US or at the world level.
It first rises and then, after 1998 falls and has in 2004 again slightly
risen. This may point towards an increased tendency to invest intra
EMU, whereas trade levels may not have been aﬀected too much from
the introduction of the common currency.
The results presented above make clear that in the public often
used comparisons between trade flows and financial flows are to be
taken with a grain of salt. First, it is not clear, which ratio should be
used. We believe we cannot use one without the other. Second, the as-
sertion that financial markets have completely disconnected from real
activity is only partially supported by our results. Using our figures, we
find evidence for "exuberance" in the 1998 and 2004 gross ICF/gross
RF ratios. Apart from that it seems that there is no secular trend to
be observed. If anything, based on our findings, we would report a
somewhat stable relationship between gross trade flows and net finan-
cial flows and a deepening of financial market integration relative to
goods market integration if the focus is on gross flows only.
7. Disentangling the aggregation bias
We will now turn our attention to the concept of aggregation bias.
As noted above, we can think of this bias arising whenever a data col-
lecting body such as a central bank or the IMF sums up and hence
possibly nets out several positions against each other. There are two
sources of this aggregation: aggregation over time and aggregation over
instruments. The first occurs whenever data that comes into the report-
ing body is transformed to meet dissemination standards, for example
daily data is transformed into monthly figures. To illustrate this point
a bit further we could think of a foreign purchase of a bond and a re-
sale of the same bond the next day. Clearly the gross capital flow - in
18Since in the German data intra dealership turnover is not accounted for we
calculate the ex intradealer FX turnover using the international average and sub-
tract this amount from the original reported. Additionally the dollar equivalent of
the trade flows is subtracted.
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domestic currency terms - connected with this transaction would be
pt + pt+1,
yet the daily net transaction would be only
∆pt.
If the following day the same transaction but with opposite sign takes
place, aggregated net flows will be zero, even though there may have
been substantial capital movements. This makes clear that the report-
ing interval determines the degree of accuracy with which reported net
figures will deliver a realistic picture of the underlying capital move-
ments.
Ideally, of course, reporting should consist of both net and gross
flow figures. To get a complete picture, we would want that the gross
figures that are presented in the national accounts are just the sums
of all transaction, without regard of the signing. Another source of
reporting bias are the thresholds that are set by the central banks. For
instance in Germany, the current threshold is 12.500 Euros, meaning
that only transactions in the volume of (or exceeding) 12.500 Euros
have to be reported. Clearly this leads to a systematic underestimation
of the actual amount of gross flows.
The second source of bias occurs when several categories of finan-
cial transactions are merged into one, e.g. several maturities and in-
struments into portfolio investment assets. Here the signs matter and
net out each other, so that under normal circumstances we get under-
reporting and accuracy only when all sub-categories are of the same
sign.
We can try to assess the extent of the aggregation bias we have
in gross flow data on the country level. The FX turnover survey data
from the BIS can safely be assumed to be as close as we will ever get to
true gross flow data. By way of comparing the estimates of ICFs using
this data with the gross data we obtained from the national reporting,
we can say something about the size of this aggregation bias that will
occur here.
7.1. The US. In this section we compare the estimates of gross
flows from the TIC with the ICFs that we obtain by using the BIS
survey. This is a comparison of gross flows with gross flows and hence
a direct measure of aggregation bias, given a couple of underlying as-
sumptions.
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1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
FX 45,1 87,8 126,4 104,1 216,7
- RFs 4,9 6,7 8,0 9,8 11,3
Total 40,2 81,1 118,4 94,4 205,4
Gross flows 23,4 29,3 74,9 99,6 154
AggBias 2:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 2:1
Table 17: US: Gross Flow Aggregation Bias
The above table shows this bias to be between 3 and 1, implying
that the for every Dollar of gross capital flows that is reported by the
TIC dataset, we observe 3 to 1 dollars gross capital flows in the foreign
exchange market. To some extent this is not very surprising. First, the
TIC system does not cover all gross capital flows that occur. The focus
there is on long-term assets, such with a maturity of one year or above.
Secondly, the data provided by the BIS survey overstates capital flows.
To obtain the BIS measure for capital flows using this data, we con-
trolled for RFs, transfers and intradealer flows. There may be, however
other activities we did not control for in the data, one example being
pure hedging activities or other speculative positions. Further, it must
be said that, even though we are controlling for intradealer positions it
remains unclear to what extent interbank dealership that is included
in our measure of gross capital flows reflects just the same activities,
namely trading of currencies without underlying capital movements. It
seems safe to assume that at least a fraction of the turnover between
banks is of this sort, but there seems no easy way to estimate this
fraction.
7.2. Germany. The picture that emerges for Germany is some-
what similar. The main diﬀerence is that in the case of Germany the
gross capital flow data that is reported in the BoP should be more accu-
rate an estimator as in the US case, for no maturities are omitted. The
ratios we obtain are smaller and hence support this assertion. A possi-
ble interpretation for the remaining aggregation bias is that the 12500
Euro threshold is at work here. In any case, what can be seen from
the data is that the bias is somewhat narrowing, both in the German
data as in the US case. There may be several reasons for that, more
accurate reporting being only one. Other that come to mind would
be decreasing share of intradealer alike trades between banks that are
included in our measure of gross ICFs, or increasing of average trans-
action size and thus rendering the threshold bias less problematic. We
report our findings below:
82 Accounting for Flows
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
FX 14,8 27,7 33,8 36,6 55,5
- RFs 4,3 5,7 5,4 6,0 3,7
Total 10,6 22,2 28,4 32,6 51,8
Gross flows 6,6 17,4 27,5 35,4 44,8
AggBias 1,5:1 1,3:1 1:1 1,3:1 1,2:1
Table 18: Germany Aggregation Bias
The information of table 18 and the trend contained is summarized
in the picture below:
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Figure 2: Aggregation Bias for Germany
8. Conclusion
In this chapter we gave an overview over the existing sources of
data on international flows of capital and goods. Data on the latter
are easy to come by, both on the national and at the supra-national
level. The former is discussed in more detail.
First of all, the distinction between gross and net flows is of im-
portance. Whereas at the national level, we typically find both types,
at the supra-national level we only find net flow data. Further, the
accuracy of the net flow data decreases from the national to the supra-
national level. This is what we call aggregation bias. This bias also
exists within gross flow data. To obtain an estimate of the aggregation
bias in the case of gross flows, we compared BIS FX turnover data with
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the reported gross flows of Germany and the US. It turns out that na-
tional reporting may underestimate gross capital flows up to a factor of
three in the US and up to a factor of one and a half in Germany. This
diﬀerence mainly reflects the more comprehensive German reporting.
In both cases we observe a decreasing trend in this bias.
The often asserted disconnect of real and financial flows (the first
reason to study international financial flows), can, if anything, only be
attributed to the ratio of gross financial flows to gross real flows. At
the world level and in the US, this ratio has increased between 1992
and 2005 by a factor of around two. In the case of Germany this factor
is around six. However, if we look at the ratio of net financial flows
to gross real flows, we see that goods market integration is actually
growing with roughly the same speed as financial market integration.
The results also show that the gross flow measure of the foreign
exchange market dominates all other measures of capital flows in size.
This suggests that there is some room for additional theories on the
issue of exchange rate determination. In any case, given the huge
amount of trading that is not related to fundamentals (e.g. intra dealer
trading), it is not overly surprising that models of the exchange rate
that are solely based on fundamentals cannot track exchange rates in
a satisfactory way. It also may indicate why the proposal of a global
turnover tax (i.e. a Tobin Tax - the second reason to study international
financial flows) has been around for so long now.
A more subtle result from our study is that, depending on the
question under consideration, either national net flow data or national
gross flow data should be used. In contrast, IMF-IFS data is highly
aggregated net data that should only be used if the eﬀort to construct
a comprehensive dataset from the national reporting of the member
states proves fruitless.

Part 3
Auxiliary Inquiries

CHAPTER 4
Expected Utility and Nonlinearly Transformed
Random Variables
The chapter deals with a particular problem economists
encounter in models with expected utility maximization.
If the first order condition is a nonlinear transformation
of the underlying random variable, explicit demand func-
tions are hard to derive. We first give an overview on
the existing mathematical tools we have to tackle the
problem and then develop each method in detail using
a simplified version of the model of the first chapter.
It turns out that deriving explicit demand functions is
always possible, as long as the economist is willing to
invoke additional restrictions on the parameter space of
the model.
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1. Introduction
The following chapter is concerned with a particular problem aris-
ing out of standard economic modeling under uncertainty. When invok-
ing expected utility maximization as proposed, for example, by Arrow
(1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) economists do touch several
delicate fields of probability theory (and topology). When dealing with
random variables in general, it holds that as long as linearity in trans-
formations - e.g. stemming from equilibrium conditions - is preserved
no great diﬃculties arise.1 If, however, the structure of the model is
more complex, especially with non-linear transformations of the ran-
dom variable (i.e. the underlying uncertainty), the problem of finding
explicit solutions to the utility maximization problem becomes more
diﬃcult and in most cases analytically intractable. At the same time
it is highly desirable to obtain explicit solutions. For one thing econo-
metric specification then becomes more rigorous, for another there are
questions that simply cannot be answered without having an explicit
solution at hand. The aim of the following chapter is first, to present
a summary on the possible methods we have and, second, en passant,
provide a toolkit to tackle nonlinearly transformed random variables.
It will become clear that in order to obtain explicit (demand) func-
tions, certain restrictions on the underlying model have to be made.
It has to be decided on a case by case basis whether or not these re-
striction are a reasonable price to pay. However, even without gaining
explicit demand functions - and thus only invoking very few restric-
tions - we can always obtain indirect demand schedules which make
comparative statics analysis feasible.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section one briefly outlines a
model which generates a non-linear transformation of the underlying
random variable. This model will serve as a reference point throughout.
The subsequent section discusses whether and when it will be possible
to evaluate the expected value of an nonlinearly transformed random
variable directly. In the following section we turn to discuss indirect
approaches that involve, for example, reversing the problem at hand or
integration by parts. The fourth section concludes the chapter.
2. The model
We start with the description of a simple OLG model (see for an
introduction to this class of models Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chap-
ter 3) or Azariadis (1993, Part II)). The example used throughout in
this section is a simplified version of the model of chapter one.
As usual there are two generations, young and old. Agents in our
model live for two periods, work when young and consume when old.
1These cases are covered to greath length in most textbooks on statistics. Ex-
amples are Feldman and Fox (1991, p. 338ﬀ.) and Whittle (2000, p.141ﬀ)
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Consumption is split up into two goods, X which is produced domesti-
cally and Y , a foreign good. Supply is governed by a constant returns
technology and perfect competition using capital and labour as inputs.
There is uncertainty about the second period price of the foreign good
which is assumed to be stochastic. This is a small open economy model,
hence domestic demand does not influence foreign prices. In the first
period of their live, period t, domestic agents can buy forwards to hedge
against price uncertainty of the foreign good which is resolved at time
of consumption, i.e. in period t+ 1. Using this very simple model the
first order condition for utility maximization reads2
E
Ã
pYt+1 − pY − (1 + rt+1)χ
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt) +
¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
Dt
!
= 0. (4.1)
where pY is the price domestic agents can fix for period t+1 consump-
tion when entering in a forward contract in t, rt+1 denotes the real
interest rate and χ the cost per unit of forward cover Dt. The random
variable in this context is P Yt+1. Unlike in economic models with a tim-
ing structure that has both forward purchase and consumption decision
of the agents in period t, the more realistic assumption that forward
purchase and consumption decision take place in diﬀerent periods, the
first order condition, i.e. equation (4.1), has the random variable both
in numerator and denominator. This in turn means that the convenient
linear properties of the expectations operator will be of limited use. In
general, making inferences about the mathematical properties of (4.1)
is not possible without evaluating the expected value, i.e. being more
specific about the distribution of the random variable.
We consider the term inside the brackets as a transformation Y of
the underlying random variable P Yt+1. It will be convenient, in what
follows, to rewrite this transformation as stated below:
Y =
X − a
bX + c1 − ab
(4.2)
where we defined
X ≡ P Yt+1
(being our original random variable) and
a ≡ pY + (1 + rt+1)χ = const.
b ≡ Dt
c ≡ (1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)− pYDt = c1 − ab
being constants in the context of finding an expected value, i.e. with
respect to the variable of integration (or summation respectively). The
control variable of the agents for their utility maximization problem is
2A more detailed description of the model can be found in app. (6.1).
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Dt, the amount of forward cover to be obtained. The solution to (4.1)
will then be a demand function
Dt = Dt (φ,Kt)
where φ is a vector of the parameters of the model andKt is the capital
stock. The diﬃculty, however, in the light of a nonlinear transformation
of the random variable, is to obtain this demand schedule explicitly,
that is in a more spelled out form than (4.1). Barring the calculation
of an exact solution, obtaining an explicit solution is not always nec-
essary to derive analytically the equilibrium properties of the model.
In fact, as is shown in chapter one many of the equilibrium properties
can be derived without explicit demand functions. However, having at
hand an explicit demand schedule facilitates econometric specification
(and thus empirical tests) and allows comparative statics analysis of
the model. Further, deriving analytical results without an explicit de-
mand schedule is more often than not very tedious and without making
additional assumptions on the structure of the solution almost always
impossible. Having at hand only first-order condition 4.1 the compara-
tive statics behavior cannot be inferred without drawing on numerical
methods. However, obtaining analytical results is clearly preferable,
especially since calibration exercises often lack accuracy (an example is
the recent discussion of second order vs. first order approximation, as
discussed for example in Kim and Kim (2003)) and introduce additional
sources of errors like ranges of relevant parameters.
In what follows we therefore investigate the possible remedies we
have for this situation. The remaining sections will briefly introduce
and discuss a host of diﬀerent approaches to our search for an explicit
demand schedule. In doing so, we will always make reference to our
benchmark transformation introduced above, but the methods used
are readily applicable to any kind of problem with a similar structure,
i.e. in economic models with choice under uncertainty and nonlinear
transformations of the random variable(s).
3. The direct road - evaluating expected values
In principle we can derive expected values of random variables in
two ways. Depending on the character of the underlying distribution,
we either calculate the probability weighted sum over a certain amount
of points of the support of the random variable or we integrate with re-
spect to the random variable weighted by the probability density func-
tion (in short p.d.f.). These two ways reflect the two distinct cases:
discrete vs. continuous support. This section will follow this structure.
We first take a glimpse at the discrete case that is often found in eco-
nomic models as benchmark and example alike. We then turn to the
more general continuous support case. It will become clear that under
the discrete support assumption there is always an explicit demand
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schedule, as long as we have a finite number of points to consider.
Contrary to that, the continuous support case is more complicated.
Although in most cases the integrals do exist, most of the time we can-
not derive closed expressions and thus cannot obtain explicit demand
functions. We will, however, always be able to make inferences about
the comparative statics behavior of the model by invoking the implicit
function theorem. In this sense, the solutions we obtain represent a
trade-oﬀ. Neglecting the increased costs of computing specific inte-
grals, to make inferences about the comparative statics behavior we
need to add the assumption of a specific distribution for the random
variable of the model. In general it will depend on the model and the
character of the underlying random variable, whether or not invoking
the additional constraint is worthwhile.
3.1. The simplest case: discrete support. In this section we
will derive an explicitly demand schedule for our small model, assuming
that the underlying price uncertainty has a discrete support. More
specifically we assume the following distribution governing our random
variable P Yt+1 = X:
pYt+1 = pL with probability α
pYt+1 = pH with probability 1− α
The expected value (4.1) is then simply given by
E (Y ) = α
Ã
pL − pY − (1 + rt+1)χ
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt) +
¡
pL − pY
¢
Dt
!
+
(1− α)
Ã
pH − pY − (1 + rt+1)χ
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt) +
¡
pH − pY
¢
Dt
!
and yields, after collecting terms and using additionally the first-order
condition E (Y ) = 0, the following explicit demand function
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt[((1− α) pH + αpL)− (1 + rt+1)χ− pY ]¡
pH − pY − (1 + rt+1)χ
¢ ¡
(1 + rt+1)χ+ pY − pL
¢
=⇒ Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt[E
¡
pYt+1
¢
− pY − (1 + rt+1)χ]
f
¡
V ar
¡
pYt+1
¢¢ (4.3)
with f
¡
V ar
¡
pYt+1
¢¢
= V ar
¡
pYt+1
¢
iff pL = 4 (α2 − 2α3 + α4). From
4.3 we can now derive the basic equilibrium properties of our model, i.e.
comparative statics behavior and conditions for an interior solution to
exist. We first note that the demand function displays the same basic
properties as found (for the continuous case, using numerical methods)
in chapter one, namely that increasing the variance of the underlying
uncertainty decreases demand for forward cover (since f (.) is increasing
in V ar(pYt+1)) and that agents need to be oﬀered more than unbiased
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(i.e. E
¡
pYt+1
¢
= pY ) forwards in order to demand a positive amount of
forwards. Further, demand is proportional to total wage income and
sensitive to increasing costs - either directly, i.e. via χ or indirectly via
the opportunity costs, i.e. the interest rate. Increasing costs, of course,
decrease demand for forward cover.
This section made clear that using discrete support is a useful start-
ing point in order to obtain first results in a setting as the above. It
is obvious that the more points the support has, the more complicated
the resulting function, i.e. in our case the demand function, will be.
The demand schedule could be derived at the expense of an extremely
simplified assumption on part of the underlying uncertainty. A more
realistic modeling approach, however, will have to include uncertainty
with continuous support. We therefore turn in the remainder of this
section (and for the rest of the chapter) our attention to this case.
3.2. Continuous support - using the transformation theo-
rem I . Consider again the non-linear transformation of our random
variable X as described by (4.2), namely:
Y =
X − a
bX + c1 − ab
This transformation was introduced in section 2. The distribution of X
is not specified in general and may be chosen in any particular context
as deemed convenient. For our purpose here it is suﬃcient to note
that the distribution of X is known to the agents of our model. We
are looking for the expected value of Y , specifically for the first order
condition
E (Y ) = 0.
Since E (Y ) is by definition
E (Y ) =
Z
S
Y fY (y) dY
where S denotes the support and fY the density of the random variable,
our problem amounts to finding the p.d.f. of Y . The most straightfor-
ward way to tackle this is by drawing on the transformation theorem.
The theorem is stated below:
Theorem 4.1 (Transformation Theorem (Pitman (1995, p.304))).
Let X be a random variable with density fX (x) on the range (l, u). Let
Y = g (X) where g is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing
on (l, u). The range of Y is then an interval with endpoints g (l) and
g (u). The density of Y on this interval is
fY (y) = fX (X (y))
¯¯¯¯
dY
dX
¯¯¯¯−1
, (4.4)
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where the absolute value of the derivative has to be used.3
There are some additional conditions4 under which the theorem
holds. However, it is relatively easy to verify that these are met in our
case.5 Turning to our model, it is easy to see that X as a function of
Y is simply given by
X =
(c1 − ab)Y + a
1− bY
and thus, in our case we have:
dX
dY
=
c1
(1− bY )2
which is, given the structure of our underlying model, always positive.
Therefore we can dispense with the absolute value operator in (4.4).
Upon insertion into (4.4) we find
fY (y) = fX
µ
(c1 − ab)Y + a
1− bY
¶
c1
(1− bY )2
(4.5)
and finally we arrive at an expression for the expected value using the
transformed density
E (Y ) =
Z
H(S)
Y fX
µ
cY + a
1− bY
¶
c1
(1− bY )2
dY (4.6)
whereH (S) stands for the transformed range of integration over which
we have to evaluate the integral. We will now illustrate the application
of the Transformation Theorem with two examples.
Example 1. Uniform Distribution
In the first example we will use (4.6) together with the assumption
of an underlying uniform distribution. We chose this distribution, since
it is particularly easy to deal with. It is well known that the p.d.f. of
an uniform distribution is given by
fUD =
1
u− l
where u and l denote the upper and the lower bound of the range of the
distribution. The expected value of an uniformly distributed variable
is then simply given by
E
¡
X|X∼UD
¢
=
Z u
l
x
1
u− ldx =
1
u− l
Z u
l
xdx =
1
u− l
u
l
·
1
2
x2
¸
=
u+ l
2
,
3Note that in our case we only deal with univariate densities. Then the term
| dYdX | does refer to a simple absolute value, whereas in the multivariate context it
refers to the determinant of the Jacobian.
4These are first continuity of the transformed density and secondly that our
transformation employed generates a one to one mapping.
5See app. (6.2) for this.
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where E
¡
X|X∼UD
¢
reads: expected value of the random variable X,
given that X follows a uniform density. Applied to our problem at
hand, i.e. equation (4.6), this leads to the following formula
E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
=
Z u∗
l∗
Y
1
u− l
c1
(1− bY )2
dY =
c1
u− l
Z u∗
l∗
Y
(1− bY )2
dY,
where we made use of the ”instruction” laid out in (4.6) and appro-
priately took care of the altered support of the new random variable,
which changes according to the transformation and hence reads:
l∗ =
l − a
bl + c1 − ab
; u∗ =
u− a
bu+ c1 − ab
.
The integral as such can be obtained using the result (see Bronstein
and Semendjajew (1987, p. 35) for reference)Z
x
(hx+ j)2
dx =
j
h2 (hx+ j)
+
1
h2
ln |(hx+ j)|+ C
where applied to our case, we have h = −b and j = 1. This in turn
leads to
E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
=
c1
u− l ×
·
1
b2 (1− bY ) +
1
b2
ln |(1− bY )|
¸u∗
l∗
(4.7)
and upon evaluation finally yields6
E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
=
1
b
+
c1
u− l
1
b2
ln
c1 − ab+ bl
c1 − ab+ bu
. (4.8)
In the last step, we now use the constraint E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
= 0. Thus (4.8)
becomes
b = − c1
u− l ln
c1 − ab+ bl
c1 − ab+ bu
.
It is now time to go back to our original model. We simply reinsert
the structure of the model and derive the demand function by solving
for Dt. To this end, we need to specify the range of the uniform dis-
tribution. Since in our context we consider price uncertainty, natural
candidates would be 0 for the lower bound, since nominal prices can-
not be negative and - as a normalization - 1 for the upper bound. The
demand function is then - implicitly - given by
Dt = (1 + rt+1)wt ln
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)− pYDt +Dt
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)− pYDt
. (4.9)
It is obvious from (4.9) that no explicit solution forDt can be obtained,
for the equation contains linear and logarithmic terms in Dt together.
Nevertheless, we can derive basic properties, e.g. the comparative static
behavior of our demand function with respect to the parameters of
6The ommited steps can be found in app. 6.3.
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the model using the implicit function theorem. This, for example,
yields dDtdχ < 0, a result that could not be obtained by using the same
technique with the f.o.c., i.e. equation (4.1).7 Hence we can summarize
that although with (4.9) we were not able to achieve our ultimate goal,
i.e. an explicit demand function forDt, we are still left with a structure
that is more convenient to analyze than our point of departure (4.1).
Example 2. Symmetric Triangular Distribution
The symmetric triangular distribution will be used in our second
example, because it is relatively straightforward to handle and makes,
given its shape, perhaps for a bit more realistic an example. The p.d.f.
of the symmetric triangular distribution with support [l, u] is given by
fTD =
2
u− l
µ
1− 2
u− l
¯¯¯¯
x− l + u
2
¯¯¯¯¶
.
The expected value is then found to be
E
¡
X|X∼TD
¢
=
Z u
l
µ
x
2
u− l
µ
1− 2
u− l
¯¯¯¯
x− l + u
2
¯¯¯¯¶¶
dx
After some algebra and further manipulations this can be condensed
to
E
¡
X|X∼TD
¢
=
a+ b
2
.
Turning again to our problem at hand, this time using the triangular
distribution, we have to solve the following integral:
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
Z u∗
l∗
Y
2
u− l × (4.10)µ
1− 2
u− l
¯¯¯¯
(c1 − ab) y + a
1− by −
l + u
2
¯¯¯¯¶
c1
(1− by)2
dy.
Again we have to specify the support of the underlying random variable
X. For our now familiar range of 0 to 1 equation (4.10) yields
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
Z u∗
l∗
µ
2y
µ
1− 2
¯¯¯¯
(c1 − ab) y + a
1− by −
1
2
¯¯¯¯¶
c1
(1− by)2
¶
dy.
(4.11)
To solve this integral we may first note that Y starts in the negative
domain and, depending on the magnitude of a, remains there or not.
Further, the integral has to be split up into two parts, to cater for the
7The result is derived in app. (6.3).
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absolute value operator:
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
Z 1−2a
2(c1−ab)+b
l∗
µ
4y2 (c1 − ab) + 4ya
1− by
¶
c1
(1− by)2
dy
+
Z u∗
1−2a
2(c1−ab)+b
µ
4y − 4y
2 (c1 − ab) + 4ya
1− by
¶
c1
(1− by)2
dy
Note that no singularity can occur as the model we introduced in sec-
tion (2) always implies 1− by > 0. We can now evaluate the integral.
We document this lenghty and somewhat tedious procedure in more
detail in the appendix (6.4). The result reads
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
1
b3
¡
b2 + 4c1[(2c1m3) lnm3 + (c1m2) lnm2 + (c1m1) lnm1]
¢
It remains to use the constraint E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
= 0, hence we set 0 =
b2 + 4c1[(2c1m3) lnm3 + (c1m2) lnm2 + (c1m1) lnm1]. Reinserting the
variables of our underlying model then gives
D2 = 4 (1 + r)w


¡
2 (1 + r) (w − χD)− 2pYD +D
¢
ln 2(1+r)w
2(1+r)(w−χD)−2pYD+D
+
¡
(1 + r) (w − χD)− pYD +D
¢
ln (1+r)w
(1+r)(w−χD)−pYD+D
+(1 + r) (w − χD) ln (1+r)w
(1+r)(w−χD)


(4.12)
where we omitted the time subscripts due to space constraints. Just
as in the first example above, equation (4.12) contains linear and log-
arithmic terms in Dt together. Therefore, we cannot solve for Dt and
have to be content with an indirect demand function. The problem lies
in the structure of the resulting integrals. Due to the transformation of
the random variable as given by (4.2) and the structure of the expec-
tations operator, we will in most cases encounter integrals that have a
polynomial structure and these in turn leave us with both linear and
logarithmic expressions in Dt in the same equation. Therefore, we can
conclude from this section that using the Transformation Theorem will
almost always result in not explicitly solvable demand functions. As
the first example has shown, however, we will be able to make com-
parative statics inferences more easily. In the remainder of the chapter
we will explore several possibilities to avoid having to deal with overly
complicated integrals.
4. The indirect way - restricting the model
4.1. Continuous support - using the transformation theo-
rem II . The two examples in the previous section have made clear
that trying to obtain an explicit function for the transformed density
may be too much of a good thing. In most cases we are only interested
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in expected values of transformed random variables (and not in the den-
sity itself). For this particular question, another form of the Transfor-
mation Theoremmay be more appropriate (see Pitman (1995, pp. 304)).
The formula is given by
E (Y ) =
Z
S
Y (x) fX (x) dx.
where fX (x) refers to the density of the underlying random variableX.
This formula, when applied to our problem at hand indeed delivers the
same results as derived in the previous sections. As such it is not more
interesting than the original Transformation Theorem (4.4). However,
an interesting application of this formula consist in choosing a density in
such a way that there are only very simple integrals left. In the context
of our transformation (4.2) this amounts to using a distribution which
has, for example, a structure as given below
fX (x) =
(bx+ c1 − ab)2
x− a .
Using this density and our now familiar transformation formula, we
arrive at
E (Y ) =
Z
S
(bx+ c1 − ab) dx
= [
1
2
bx2 + (c1 − ab)x]ul
=
1
2
b
¡
u2 − l2
¢
+ (c1 − ab) (u− l) = 0
=⇒ b = c11
2
(u+ l)− a
which implies, given the structure of our underlying model, that
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt
1
2
(u+ l)− (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
. (4.13)
Equation (4.13) represents an explicit demand function with reasonable
economic properties. Note, however, that for this demand function to
be valid, another condition has to be met, namelyZ u
l
fX (x) dx = 1,
which ensures that the density we chose is regular. In our example this
yields a relatively complicated expression8 that, in eﬀect, represents a
mapping from the parameter space of our model to the support of the
8A detailed derivation is shown in app. (6.3) .
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distribution of the underlying uncertainty. More formally we have
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt
1
2
(u+ l)− (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
(4.14)
s.t. ξ (φ, u, l) = 0
where φ represents the parameter vector of our model. This formulation
makes clear that the approach chosen comes at a well defined cost. We
can either chose to restrict the parameter values of our model in order to
satisfy a certain assumption about the support of the random variable,
or restrict the support in order to satisfy the constraints the model
levies on the parameter values. In any event, if such constraints are
feasible, i.e. will not damage the economic content of the underlying
model, this is a straightforward way, as shown above, to derive an
explicit demand function.
4.2. Continuous support - using integration by parts. An-
other alternative that is closely related to the approach discussed in
section (4.1) is to tackle the problem the other way around and to de-
fine a distribution which suits the purpose. This is the approach to be
taken in this section. Suppose we are given a bijective transformation,
formally
X (Y ) = Y −1 (Y ) .
This can, for example, accommodate for our equation (4.2). Then we
can establish the following line of reasoning
E (Y ) =
Z
S
Y fY (y) dY =
Z
S
Y fX (X (y))
¯¯¯¯
dX
dY
¯¯¯¯
dY
=
Z
S
Y h (Y ) dY
which makes use of (4.4) and defines
h (Y ) = fX (X (y))
¯¯¯¯
dX
dY
¯¯¯¯
=
dF (X (y))
dY
,
where F (X (y)) denotes the cumulative density function (in short c.d.f.)
of fX (X (y)). A well known result in calculus9, often referred to as in-
tegration by parts, is thatZ
uv0dy = uv −
Z
u0vdy.
We can apply this readily to our problem at hand, resulting in
E (Y ) =
Z
Y
dF (X (Y ))
dY
dY = Y F (X (Y ))−
Z
F (X (Y )) dY,
9See any good textbook on analysis, e.g. Rudin (1993)
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and thus converting our problem to the mere integration of a c.d.f.. If
we employ a distribution which has a closed range, we can equivalently
state
E (Y ) = [Y F (X (y))]u
∗
l∗ −
Z u∗
l∗
F (X (y)) dY. (4.15)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4.15) is simply a
c.d.f. evaluated at the lower and upper bounds. This in turn must
yield 0 and 1 respectively. Hence, expression (4.15) simplifies to
E (Y ) = u∗ −
Z u∗
l∗
F (X (y)) dY.
Again, as discussed in section (3.2), we have to be careful about our
boundaries: those we used above refer to the already converted. The
expected value we are looking for has, since it is a first order condition of
an optimization problem, to be zero. This condition further simplifies
the algebraic expression for E (Y ) to
u∗ =
Z u∗
l∗
F (X (y)) dY = [H (X (y))]u
∗
l∗ = H (u
∗)−H (l∗) (4.16)
where H (X (y)) is mathematically equivalent to the integral of a c.d.f..
In principle, we are now free to assume any distribution (and thus
c.d.f.) that suits our purpose here. To present a relatively accessible
example, we will in what follows work with the assumption that, first,
the transformed random variable Y (X) has an uniform density and
second that the original random variable X has as its support the
non-negative real line. It is well known that the c.d.f. of an uniform
distribution with support [l, u] is simply given by
F (x)UD =



0 if x ≤ l
x−l
u−l if l < x < u
1 if x ≥ u
.


 (4.17)
Using formula (4.16) together with (4.17) leaves us with
H (y) =
Z u∗
l∗
y − l∗
u∗ − l∗dy =
1
2
(u∗ − l∗) .
10We then use the support of the underlying random variable X, insert
into (4.2) (and evaluate limits where appropriate). This yields u∗ = 1b
and l∗ = − ac1−ab . These results together with (4.16) bring about b =
c1
2a
which in turn, upon reinserting our model structure yields the demand
function
Dt =
(1 + rt)wt
2
¡
(1 + rt)χ+ pY
¢ . (4.18)
Note that this demand function makes intuitively sense. The demand
for forward cover increases with wage income and decreases with the
10See app. (6.6.1) for the derivation.
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contracted forward price and rising opportunity costs. However, we do
not know anything about the properties of the underlying distribution
other than that its support is the non-negative real line. We there-
fore have no way of knowing whether the implicit assumption about
the distribution of foreign price uncertainty matches empirical findings
or not. It thus depends mainly on the problem under consideration
whether or not we can make use of this approach.
We will now turn to a second example to illustrate the "Integrations-
by-parts-approach". The triangular distribution will again serve as the
second simplest distribution. The c.d.f. of the symmetric triangular
distribution is given by
F (x)TD =



0 if x ≤ l
2(l−x)2
(l−u)2 if l < x ≤
u+l
2
1
2
+ (u+l−2x)(3u+2x−3u+l)
2(l−u)2 if
u+l
2
< x < u
1 if x ≥ u.



(4.19)
Using equation (4.16) then yields 7
19
c1
a = b
11. Reinserting the structure
of our model another explicit demand function emerges, this time based
on the assumptions that the transformed density is triangular and the
support of the underlying uncertainty is the non-negative real line:
Dt =
7 (1 + rt)wt
19
¡
(1 + rt)χ+ pY
¢ . (4.20)
The two resulting demand functions of this section, i.e. equation (4.18)
and (4.20), are in fact identical up to a scalar transformation and hence
share the same intuitively appealing properties. This, however, is not
overly surprising, since the uniform and the triangular distributions are
very similar in nature. Natural questions that then arise are: What
other distributions can be used to yield explicit demand functions using
the "Integrations-by-parts-approach"? and, related to this: What are
the properties of the demand functions under diﬀerent distributional
assumptions?. These simple extensions, however, bring the approach of
this section to its limits. For example, the assumption of an underlying
exponential distribution already results in demand functions without
explicit solution. As a rule, we can state that as long as we have ex-
ponential (or logarithmic) and linear terms together, the approach of
this section (just like the others) will fail to deliver.
5. Conclusion
The present chapter dealt with the question of how to derive explicit
demand schedules under expected utility maximization when there is a
nonlinear transformation of the underlying random variable. We first
set out a simple OLG model in which we encountered a nonlinearly
11See app (6.6.2) for detailed derivation.
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transformed random variable as first order condition. The subsequent
discussion showed that under discrete and finite support, there will
always be an explicit demand schedule. We then turned to the more
general case of a random variable with continuous support. With con-
tinuous random variables, there are three diﬀerent possible approaches
to our problem.
The first and most direct, using the transformation theorem, does
not normally lead to an explicit demand function. This is due to the
complications encountered when solving the resulting integrals. How-
ever, using the direct approach we are always able to obtain indirect
demand schedules that are better suited for tasks like comparative sta-
tics analysis than the "raw" first order condition of the model.
The second approach we introduced uses a variant of the Transfor-
mation Theorem. The trick here is to choose a distribution for the un-
derlying random variableX on grounds of easy mathematical handling.
This might be, in terms of economic content, questionable, a thorough
discussion of the properties of the new born distribution surely being
in order. This approach will normally lead to explicit demand func-
tions, but at the cost of additional restrictions on the parameter space
of the model. In that sense this approach represents a trade-oﬀ: more
restrictions against an explicit demand schedule.
The last road to be taken goes a completely diﬀerent way. Using the
integration by parts result from calculus, we defined a transformed den-
sity, without having to draw on the underlying distribution. Using this
device, we were able to obtain explicit demand functions for suﬃciently
simple densities like uniform and triangular. The resulting demand
functions are economically meaningful and bear structurally close re-
semblance to the those derived in the other sections of the chapter. The
same criticism as for the other ”economically ignorant” method applies
here in a more general way: the distribution of the transformed random
variable Y is chosen, thus implying a distribution for the underlying
random variable X. Therefore a check what kind of underlying distrib-
ution this approach creates seems to be in order. This check, however,
may not always be feasible.
From our discussion of the diﬀerent tools we have to approach non-
linearly transformed random variables in a framework of expected util-
ity maximization one result clearly stands out: the more restrictions
we can invoke on the underlying model, the closer we get to an ex-
plicit demand schedule. The question then is, of course, whether or
not the trade-oﬀ is worthwhile. In general this will depend on the eco-
nomic model under consideration and the character of the underlying
uncertainty.
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6. Mathematical appendix
This Appendix is concerned with the derivation of the results used
in the text. In most cases it contains the bits and pieces of everyday
math which are easy to follow but demand too much space to be left
in the main text.
6.1. The details of the model. This appendix briefly lines out
the optimization problem of the agents that leads to (4.1) in the text.
The model further features the capital accumulation equation and an
equilibrium of our model will be a vector (D,K). The equilibrium con-
dition for the capital stock is not relevant for the scope of the chapter
and will therefore be omitted in what follows. The choice problem of
an agent born in t is given by
max
CX ,CY ,Dt
U (CX , CY )
where CX and CY represent consumption levels in the second period
of the life of an agent. Under the additional assumption of a log utility
function, (as proposed by Arrow (1974, Chapter 3)), namely
U (CX , CY ) = a lnCX + (1− α) lnCY
we know the optimal levels of consumption under certainty to be
CX =
αe
pX
; CY =
(1− α) e
pY
where e is our budget constraint. Now reinserted in our utility maxi-
mization problem, we arrive at
max
D
E
µ
α ln
αe
pX
+ (1− α) ln (1− α) e
pY
¶
as the ”new” problem the agent faces in t knowing the structure of his
decision in t+1. This is a period t decision and under uncertainty about
the price of the foreign good in t+ 1. The solution to this problem is
a first order condition
E
µ
1
e
∂e
∂D
¶
!
= 0
and together with
e = (1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt) +
¡
pYt+1 − pY
¢
D
establishes equation (4.1)used in the text throughout.
6.2. The applicability of the Transformation Theorem .
This appendix verifies that the transformations theorem can be used
for our transformation (4.2). Following theorem (4.4) we need that our
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transformation is monotonous on the support of the underlying random
variable X, i.e. [l, u]. For this it is suﬃcient to note that
dY
dX
=
c+ ab
(bX + c)2
> 0 ∀x
the transformation is strictly increasing on [l, u]. The second, im-
plicit, condition is bijectivity of the transformation, i.e. the existence
of Y (X)−1. This can be easily shown by solving (4.2) for Y . This
yields an unique solution, X = cY+a
1−bY . Therefore we can state that our
transformation is bijective.
6.3. The uniform distribution example . We start out the
result (4.7) for the integral of the uniform density in the text, namely
E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
=
µ
c1
u− l
¶
1
b2
× {
1³
1− b u−abu+c1−ab
´ + ln ¯¯¯¯µ1− b u− a
bu+ c1 − ab
¶¯¯¯¯
− 1³
1− b l−abl+c1−ab
´ − ln ¯¯¯¯µ1− b l − a
bl + c1 − ab
¶¯¯¯¯
}.
This expression has two distinct parts, one linear L the other one in-
volving logs LG, hence E
¡
Y|X∼UD
¢
= L+ LG. The linear part reads:
L =
c1
u− l
1
b2

 1³
1− b u−abu+c1−ab
´ − 1³
1− b l−abl+c1−ab
´


=
1
b
.
The remaining part of our integral is then given by
LG =
c1
u− l
1
b2
µ
ln
¯¯¯¯µ
1− b u− a
bu+ c1 − ab
¶¯¯¯¯
− ln
¯¯¯¯µ
1− b l − a
bl + c1 − ab
¶¯¯¯¯¶
=
c1
u− l
1
b2
ln
bl + c1 − ab
bu+ c1 − ab
.
Note that in order to arrive at this last equation the absolute value
operator had to be dispensed with. It is straightforward to see that
neither expression can become negative, especially since c1 − ab will
never be any smaller than zero. Merging the two results together yields
(4.8) in the text.
The comparative static behavior of (4.9) with respect to a change
in χ can be obtained by calculating
dD
dχ
= −
∂F
∂χ
∂F
∂D
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where F = D− (1 + r)w ln (1+r)(w−χD)−p
YD+D
(1+r)(w−χD)−pYD . The partial derivatives
with respect to the costs of forward cover χ is given by
∂F
∂χ
=
k1D
w
µ
−D
(n1 +D)n1
¶
< 0
with k1 = (1 + r)w and n1 = k1
¡
1− χDw
¢
− pYD. By virtue of the
no bankruptcy condition, n1 is positive. Therefore the derivative is
negative. The partial derivative with respect to D reads
∂F
∂D
= 1− k1
µ
pY +
k1
w
χ
¶µ
1
n1
− 1
n1 +D
¶
− k1
n1 +D
< 0,
where k1n1+D > 1 (due to k1 > n1+D), rendering the derivative negative.
6.4. The triangular distribution example . We start with the
analytical expression for the expected value, equation (4.11):
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
Z u∗
l∗
2y
µ
1− 2
µ
|(c1 − ab) y + a
1− by −
1
2
|
¶
c1
(1− by)2
¶
dy
where l∗ = − ac1−ab and u
∗ = 1−ac1−ab+b . Due to the absolute value opera-
tor within (4.11) we have to split the integral into two, depending on
(c1−ab)y+a
1−by ≶ 12 . We verify this simply by setting
(c1 − ab) y + a
1− by =
1
2
which yields
y = m∗ =
1− 2a
2c1 − 2ab+ b
.
This is clearly below our upper boundary of integration as
1− a
c1 − ab+ b
− 1− 2a
2c1 − 2ab+ b
=
c1
(c1 − ab+ b) (2c1 − 2ab+ b)
> 0
shows. Hence we split (4.11) into two integrals as follows:
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
Z m∗
l∗
2y
µ
1− 2
µ
1
2
− (c1 − ab) y + a
1− by
¶
c1
(1− by)2
¶
dy
+
Z u∗
m∗
2y
µ
1− 2
µ
(c1 − ab) y + a
1− by −
1
2
¶
c1
(1− by)2
¶
dy
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Collecting terms and sorting the remaining sections into manageable
parts, we end up with the following three basic integrals to be evalu-
ated:
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
= 4 (c1 − ab) c1
Z m∗
l∗
y2
(1− by)3
dy + 4ac1
Z m∗
l∗
y
(1− by)3
+4c1
Z u∗
m∗
y
(1− by)2
dy − 4 (c1 − ab) c1
Z u∗
m∗
y2
(1− by)3
dy
−4ac1
Z u∗
m∗
y
(1− by)3
dy.
This in turn can concisely be written as
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
= k (2F (m∗)− F (u∗)− F (l∗))
+
ak
c1 − ab
(2G (m∗)−G (u∗)−G (l∗))
+
k
c1 − ab
(H (u∗)−H (m∗))
where we defined k = 4c1 (c1 − ab) ; F (.) =
R y2
(1−by)3dy; G (.) =
R y
(1−by)3dy
and H (.) =
R y
(1−by)2dy. Analytical solutions for each of these integrals
exist. They read
F (.) =
1
2b3 (1− by)2
− 2
b3 (1− by) −
ln (1− by)
b3
G (.) =
1
2b2 (1− by)2
− 1
b2 (1− by)
H (.) =
1
b2 (1− by) +
ln (1− by)
b2
and can be obtained by trial and error procedures or from integral ta-
bles as found in (Bronstein and Semendjajew (1987)). The remaining
algebra is tedious but not complicated. The result reads:
E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
=
1
2
k
b3
¡
2m23 −m22 −m21
¢
− k
b3
(2 lnm3 − lnm2 − lnm1)
+
1
2
ak
(c1 − ab) b3
¡
2m23 −m22 −m21
¢
+
k
c1 − ab
µ
1
2bc1
+
1
b2
(lnm3 − lnm2)
¶
=
1
b3
¡
b2 + 4c1[(2c1m3) lnm3 + (c1m2) lnm2 + (c1m1) lnm1]
¢
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where we set m1 = c1−abc1 , m2 = m1 +
b
c1
and m3 = m1 + b2c1 . Using
the first order condition E
¡
Y|X∼TD
¢
= 0 we can simplify further and
arrive at
b2 = 4c1
¡
(2c1 − 2ab+ b) lnm−13 + (c1 − ab+ b) lnm−12 + (c1 − ab) lnm−11
¢
.
We now reinsert the underlying variables of our model and will finally
be left with:
D2 = 4 (1 + r)w


(2 (1 + r) (w − χD)− 2pYD +D) ln 2(1+r)w2(1+r)(w−χD)−2pYD+D
+((1 + r) (w − χD)− pYD +D) ln (1+r)w(1+r)(w−χD)−pYD+D
+(1 + r) (w − χD) ln (1+r)w
(1+r)(w−χD)

 .
This is (4.12) in the text.
6.5. The Transformation Theorem II. This appendix provides
an example for the type of restrictions encountered when using the ap-
proach introduced in section (4.1). There an explicit demand function
is derived subject to that another condition,
R
fXdx = 1, has to be
met. The assumed density is given by fX =
(bx+c1−ab)2
x−a . Hence the
condition reads Z u
l
(bx+ c1 − ab)2
x− a dx = 1.
The integral can be found with the help of integral tables and is our
case equal to
[bx (2c1 − ab) +
b2x2
2
+ c21 ln |x− a|]ul = 1.
Evaluating yields
b (u− l) (2c1 − ab) +
b2 (u2 − l2)
2
+ c21 ln |
u− a
l − a | = 1.
For any given support of the distribution [l, u] this will result in a
mapping from one parameter of the model to the other, restricting the
degrees of freedom in choosing parameters for our underlying model.
For example, if we would assume [l, u] = [0, 1] we would get
b (2c1 − ab) +
b2
2
+ c21 ln |
1− a
−a | = 1.
Inserting the structure of our model, we find
Dt
¡
(1 + rt+1) (wt − χDt)− pYDt
¢
+
D2t
2
+(1 + rt+1)wt ln |1− (1 + r)χ+ p
Y
− (1 + r)χ+ pY
| = 1.
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Finally, replacing Dt with (4.14) then yields
(1 + rt+1)wt
1
2
− (1 + rt+1)χ− pY

 (1 + rt+1)
³
wt − χ (1+rt+1)wt1
2
−(1+rt+1)χ−pY
´
−pY (1+rt+1)wt1
2
−(1+rt+1)χ−pY


+
µ
(1 + rt+1)wt
1
2
− (1 + rt+1)χ− pY
¶2
1
2
+ (1 + rt+1)wt ln |1− (1 + r)χ− p
Y
− (1 + r)χ− pY
| = 1
which may be satisfied, for example, by a suitable choice of χ.
6.6. The "Integration-By-Parts-Approach".
6.6.1. The uniform distribution example . Consider equation (4.16).
In order to solve it we need to evaluate u∗and l∗ and integrate the c.d.f.
(4.17). We start with the boundaries. By assumption, we have [l, u] =
[0,∞). Our transformation (4.2) is such that u∗ = limx→∞ x−abx+c1−ab =
1
b
and l∗ = − ac1−ab . These are the boundaries used in the text. The in-
tegral of the c.d.f. is given by
R x
l∗
x−l∗
u∗−l∗dx =
1
2
[x
2−2xl∗
u∗−l∗ ]
u∗
l∗ =
1
2
(u∗ − l∗)
which is used in the text.
6.6.2. The triangular distribution example . Equation (4.16) is again
our point of departure. The integral of the c.d.f.. (4.19) is given byR x
l∗
2(l−x)2
(l−u)2 dx+
R x
u∗+l∗
2
1
2
+ (u+l−2x)(3u+2x−3u+l)
2(l−u)2 dx. The two resulting inte-
grals read
HL =
2 (l∗ − x)2 (x− l∗)
3 (l∗ − u∗)2
and
HU =
(2x− l∗ − u∗) (5l∗2 − u∗2 + 10u∗x− 4x2 − 2l∗ (4u∗ + x))
12 (l∗ − u∗)2
.
Equation (4.16) then reads
1
b
= [HL]
u∗+l∗
2
l∗ + [HU ]
u∗
u∗+l∗
2
.
Evaluating these expressions is straightforward and yields
1
b
=
5
12
µ
1
b
+
a
c1 − ab
∗
¶
.
Finally, solving for b results in
b =
7
19
c1
a
which is used in the text.
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